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United States Supreme Court 1977-1978 Term: 
Criminal Law Decisions 
B. J George, Jr. * 
The Supreme Court last Term issued several interesting and 
highly controversial decisions relating to criminal law and proce- 
dure. The Court directed much of its attention to three areas: 
investigative activities under the fourth amendment, administra- 
tion of the double jeopardy clause, and the scope of the Federal 
Civil Rights Act. In retrospect, however, there has been no mas- 
sive restructuring of fundamental constitutional doctrine. The 
outlines of protection afforded by certain constitutional guaran- 
tees have been somewhat clarified and, particularly in several 
search and seizure cases, efforts by some states to exploit recent 
so-called law and order decisions have been firmly squelched. 
In some contexts, notably the capital penalty decisions and 
the Court's ruling on press access to jails, the absence of a solid 
majority of the Justices supporting any one doctrine gives little 
guidance in the resolution of important cognate questions. This 
may reflect the want of a doctrinaire majority (which cannot be 
altered short of changes in the Court's personnel) or perhaps a 
tacit acceptance of the premise that sweeping statements of con- 
stitutional theory should be left to academicians. In any event, 
the Term saw many fascinating criminal cases disposed of in 
highly intriguing fashion. This Article surveys and synthesizes 
the Court's grappling in the criminal law area. For convenience, 
the discussion has two major divisions: the first dealing with 
procedure from investigation through posttrial processing; the 
second with substantive criminal law. 
A. Investigation 
1 .  Search warrants 
States have been about evenly divided on the question of 
whether the veracity of affidavits tendered in support of a search 
warrant application can be impeached after execution of the war- 
rant in an effort to invalidate it. In Franks u. Delaware,' the 
* President, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Richardson, Texas 
1. 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978). 
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Supreme Court aligned itself on the side of impeachability. In an 
effort to void a search warrant which had resulted in seizure of 
evidence that was possibly crucial in later jury deliberations the 
defense brought forward two informants named in the search war- 
rant application who were prepared to testify that the officers had 
significantly distorted their statements. Defense counsel averred 
that misstatements in the affidavit were not inadvertent, but 
rather were submitted in bad faith. The state courts ruled that 
the credibility of search warrant affidavits could not be attacked 
after a warrant had been issued; rather, an issuing magistrate was 
to be the sole arbiter of credibility. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Court outlined procedure whereby the defense can over- 
come the presumption of judicial regularity that extends to 
search warrant affidavits. First, a defendant must allege deliber- 
ate falsehood or reckless disregard for truth on the part of an 
affiant officer. Assertions of negligence or innocent mistake are 
insufficient, and the requisite deliberate or reckless falsehood 
must be that of the affiant, not a third-party nongovernmental 
informant. Second, an offer of proof must be tendered in support 
of a suppression motion. Conclusory terms are insufficient, as is 
a mere desire on the part of the defense to cross-examine the 
source of information in an affidavit. Allegations must identify 
specifically the aspect of an affidavit claimed to be false, and 
must be documented by a statement of supporting reasons. Affi- 
davits, sworn statements, or otherwise reliable declarations of 
witnesses must be appended, or their absence suitably explained. 
If the defense meets these pleading and proof requirements, 
the Court held that a fullblown hearing must be held on the 
matter. If at that hearing the defense establishes by a preponder- 
ance of the evidence that perjury or reckless disregard for truth 
has tainted one or more affidavits, then the court must determine 
whether, after the data in the false affidavits are set aside, enough 
other valid material remains to justify issuance of the warrant. If 
it does, the warrant is valid. If it does not, the warrant must be 
voided and the evidence seized on its authority excluded exactly 
as if probable cause were absent on the face of the affidavits. 
The majority opinion contains several interesting doctrinal 
asides bearing on the state's policy arguments favoring admissi- 
bility of the evidence. First, it was argued that invocation of the 
exclusionary rule in the context of veracity of search warrant 
affidavits would have too little deterrent effect to justify the ex- 
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clusion of otherwise valid e~idence.~ The Court, however, felt that 
forbidding all impeachment of affidavits would render the consti- 
tutional requirement of probable cause essentially a nullity. Even 
deliberately false affidavits would be unimpeachable, and ensu- 
ing phases of a criminal prosecution are not well designed to 
expose intentional falsehoods perpetrated during ex parte war- 
rant proceedings. 
Next, the prosecution contended that magistrates them- 
selves are sufficiently independent to protect fourth amendment 
rights. The Court disagreed for several reasons. Warrant proceed- 
ings are ex parte, and are usually conducted in haste to forestall 
destruction or removal of desired evidence; deliberation is only 
moderate. Moreover, magistrates rarely have a close enough ac- 
quaintance with the case or claimed sources of information to 
generate suspicion about the sufficiency or adequacy of affidavits. 
In theory, magistrates can conduct fairly vigorous inquiries into 
the reliability of supporting data, but in practice they do not. The 
Court did not, however, believe that its holding diminished the 
importance and solemnity of the warrant issuance process. The 
underlying problem is the ex parte nature of the proceeding, not 
the integrity or capacity of the magistrate who conducts it. In any 
event, because the Court required that misstatements be inten- 
tional or based on reckless disregard for the truth,3 magistrates' 
determinations will be final in most instances. 
The Court also noted that there was no other adequate rem- 
edy for official misconduct in making false affidavits. Drawing 
from its original exclusionary rule h~ld ing ,~  the Court stressed the 
unreasonableness of expecting prosecutors to lodge criminal 
charges, or supervisory police personnel to initiate disciplinary 
proceedings, against officers who deliberately or recklessly falsify 
affidavits. 
The state also contended that to permit inquiries into the 
veracity of search warrant affidavits would confuse the issue of 
defendant guilt or innocence with that of whether official miscon- 
duct underlay the affidavits. This in turn would affect already 
crowded dockets, especially because defense counsel might use 
affidavit hearings as a discovery device. Once more, the majority 
2. This premise was drawn from the Court's statement in such decisions as Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). 
3. The Court did not define recklessness, but presumably one may look to modem 
penal code usage, of which the Model Penal Code is the prototype. MODEL PENAL CODE # 
2.02(2) (c) (proposed official draft, 1962). 
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U S .  643 (1961). 
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disagreed. Hearings on the issue are not before a jury, and the 
Court's requirement of a showing of intentional or reckless mis- 
statement sufficiently protects against use of a suppression hear- 
ing for discovery p~rposes .~ 
Finally, the prosecution asserted that the defense position 
would extend the fourth amendment exclusionary rule into an 
area in which control of misconduct is difficult because of the 
traditional use in affidavits of hearsay statements based on fleet- 
ing observations and tips from anonymous, transient sources of 
information. The Court also rejected that premise, reasoning that 
inquiry into the integrity of affidavits does not differ substan- 
tially from the examination of their sufficiency, which has long 
been required under the fourth amendment. Moreover, the Court 
has not yet withdrawn from its position that the exclusionary rule 
can always be used to reach "substantial and deliberate" official 
misconduct .6 
It is difficult to fault the Franks decision on theoretical 
grounds or to disagree with the majority conclusion that a nonim- 
peachment rule would leave official perjury unchecked. The 
Court's desire to limit the number of cases in which impeachment 
can be attempted is evident in its delineation of the procedures 
to be followed and in the clear placement of the burden of persua- 
sion on the defense. Despite those limits, however, the judicial 
system must now contend with what the dissenters denominate 
the "natural tendency of ingenious lawyers charged with repre- 
senting their client's cause to ceaselessly undermine the limita- 
tions which the Court has placed on impeachment of the affida- 
vits offered in support of a search warrant."' 
2. Search incident to arrest 
Supreme Court decisions that law enforcement officials find 
burdensome are sometimes the product of relentlessly pursuing 
cases that ought to have been written off by prosecuting authori- 
ties at a much earlier stage.8 Hardnosed cases make bad law for 
5. The Court left open, however, the issue whether an underlying informer's identity 
must be revealed once a preliminary showing has been made that an affidavit containing 
information allegedly so derived is false. 98 S. Ct. at 2684. That question is not necessarily 
governed by the Court's earlier holding that informer identity need not routinely be 
disclosed during suppression or other pretrial proceedings. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 
300 (1967). 
6. 98 S. Ct. at 2684. 
7. Id. at 2692 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
8. E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (interrogation of counseled defendant 
in the face of specific commitments to counsel not to interrogate); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
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prosecutors. An example in the last Term is Mincey v. Arizona.' 
During a narcotics arrest precipitating a volley of gunfire, an 
officer was killed and Mincey seriously injured. Officers partici- 
pating in the raid aided the injured but otherwise left the scene 
uninvestigated. Homicide detectives arrived shortly afterward 
and remained on the scene four days, searching the premises with 
minute care and removing between 200 and 300 pieces of evi- 
dence. No search warrant was ever obtained. On the strength of 
a "murder scene" exception to the fourth amendment warrant 
requirement,%tate courts rejected defense efforts to suppress the 
evidence. The Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court found that the facts of Mincey fell within none of 
the special circumstances which have been held to justify war- 
rantless searches.ll The Court rejected the contention that citi- 
zens lose all reasonable expectations of privacy by committing 
crimes12 because such reasoning "would impermissibly convict 
the suspect even before the evidence against him was gathered."13 
The prosecution also asserted that the invasion of privacy occa- 
sioned by the initially lawful entry justified additional or contin- 
ued intrusion in the form of a search. This, the Court believed, 
was not so; although arrest brings about reduced personal pri- 
vacy,14 it does not mean that an arrested person has "a lessened 
right of privacy in his entire house."15 
The majority opinion then considered the legitimacy of the 
"murder scene exception" to the fourth amendment warrant re- 
quirement as delineated by the Arizona courts. The Court held 
that a limited exception indeed exists: officers may make war- 
rantless entries and searches "when they reasonably believe that 
a person within is in need of immediate aid," and when arriving 
at a homicide scene "they may make a prompt warrantless search 
- - -  
U.S. 590 (1975) (protracted interrogation following unlawful entry and arrest); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (ransacking search after patently unlawful entry into residence). 
9. 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978). The interrogation aspect of this case is discussed in the text 
accompanying notes 99-103 infra. 
10. The "murder scene" exception applied to situations where the circumstances of 
a homicide or serious personal injury suggested foul play, and where officers were already 
legally on the premises. 98 S. Ct. at 2412. 
11. The Court canvassed the authorities. Id. at 2412-13. 
12. The same contention had been considered and set aside in the Court's arson 
investigation ruling, Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978) (discussed in text accompa- 
nying notes 28-37 infra). 
13. 98 S. Ct. at 2413. 
14. The Court cited decisions regarding searches incident to custodial arrest, United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and deferred booking searches, United States v. 
Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974). See also Gustafson v .  Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
15. 98 S. Ct. at 2413. 
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of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on 
the premi~es."~Wuring that action, "the police may seize any 
evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legiti- 
mate emergency activities."17 But the Court refused to character- 
ize a search of the length and intensity manifested in Mincey as 
falling within that limited exception. 
In essence, the Court rejected the idea that every murder 
case justifies an exception to the warrant requirement. Anything 
advanced in favor of such an exception could be used to support 
investigations of other forcible felonies. The fact that criminal 
investigations might be more efficiently conducted under such a 
sweeping exception carries no weight; a true emergency justifica- 
tion must be found. On the facts of Mincey there was no exigency 
beyond the fact of homicide; there was no indication that evi- 
dence would be lost, destroyed, or removed while a search war- 
rant was obtained. "Indeed, the police guard at the apartment 
minimized that possibility."18 Fundamentally, the Arizona 
"murder scene" exception was not strictly circumscribed. The so- 
called guidelines which the state courts had developed "confer 
unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such 
terms as 'reasonable . . . search,' 'serious personal injury with 
likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play,' and 
'reasonable period.'"lV In the court's view, these are terms a neu- 
tral and detached magistrate, not a police officer, ought to inter- 
pret and apply if fourth amendment values are to be safeguarded. 
3. Administrative searches 
The Court last Term thoroughly explained, but did not sub- 
stantially revise, the doctrines governing administrative searches 
set forth in its earlier jurisprudence." Marshall v. Barlow S, Inc. 21 
dealt with the provision of the Federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 that allows Department of Labor inspectors 
16. Id. at 2414. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 2415. The Court had earlier held that packages could be withheld from 
postal delivery while a search warrant was obtained. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 
U.S. 249 (1970). Similarly, the Court had indicated that a footlocker containing a con- 
trolled substance could be retained in police custody pending application for a search 
warrant. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). The quoted Mincey language 
assumed a like power to control premises while a warrant is sought. 
19. 98 S. Ct. at 2415. 
20. The prototype decisions are See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (commercial 
premises), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (residential property). 
21. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978). 
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to enter commercial or industrial premises covered by the statute 
during reasonable times.22 Barlow refused to allow an OSHA 
inspector to enter his plumbing business unless he showed a 
search warrant. The official then obtained a federal court order 
requiring Barlow to admit him, but Barlow again refused to 
admit the inspector and commenced his own action for federal 
injunctive relief against warrantless OSHA searches. A three- 
judge federal court ruled in his favor, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
The Court held that OSHA inspections constitute no special 
exception to the rule that the fourth amendment warrants clause 
governs searches of commercial as well as private premises. The 
Court had recognized earlier that "pervasively regulated" enter- 
prises are subject to warrantless inspections conducted during 
working hours standard for the class of en t e rp r i~e ,~~  but industries 
and businesses falling within OSHA legislation do not thereby 
become pervasively regulated  enterprise^.^^ Nor did the Court's 
rulings allowing solicitation of union membership on employer 
premisesz justify the government's warrantless search since in 
those cases the employer had voluntarily opened its premises to 
employees who had statutory organizational rights. 
Essentially, the Court disbelieved the government conten- 
tion that OSHA administative procedures provided as much pro- 
tection of individual privacy as a search or inspection warrant. In 
the Court's view, ex parte warrant proceedings safeguard against 
the possibility of altered circumstances in premises to be in- 
spected to the same extent agency administrative authorization 
might. The Court was also unconcerned over additional strain a 
warrant requirement might impose on the agency and on federal 
courts. Most business owners will consent to inspection, the Court 
assumed, and delay will not be excessive in the instances in which 
they do not. 
The majority opinion then turned to the requisites for an 
administrative inspection order. Such an order does not require 
a probable cause showing that an OSHA violation exists; the 
criminal prosecution standard does not govern. 
22. 29 U.S.C. fi 657(a) (1976). 
23. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearms dealer); Colonnade Cater- 
ing Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor business). 
24. The Court had taken a similar position during the preceding Term when the 
government argued that taxpayer premises were subject to warrantless entries by IRS 
officials. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977). 
25. E.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 98 S.  Ct. 2463 (1978); NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
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A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for 
an OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan 
for the enforcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such 
as, for example, dispersion of employees in various types of in- 
dustries across a given area, and the desired frequency of 
searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, would protect 
an employer's Fourth Amendment rights.26 
The protections given to employers' privacy, in the Court's 
view, are not marginal. A warrant gives "assurances from a neu- 
tral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitu- 
tion, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administra- 
tive plan containing specific neutral   rite ria."^' A warrant also 
sets limits on the scope and objectives of a search, compliance 
with which can be observed and enforced. Hence, the Court held 
the injunction against OSHA search practices was properly is- 
sued. Barlow's, Inc. did not determine whether other forms of 
federal regulatory inspections are under precisely the same con- 
trols. One may assume, however, that the fourth amendment 
principles discussed in Barlow's, Inc. will govern inspection prac- 
tice under other federal and state regulatory legislation as well, 
notwithstanding the Court's disclaimer. 
Some administrative inspections are close to the borderline 
between civil and criminal law enforcement. In Michigan v. 
Tyler," the Court decisively dealt with the form of investigation 
that has caused the greatest amount of litigation in recent years: 
arson investigations. While fire personnel were extinguishing a 
nighttime blaze on Tyler's premises, they discovered and seized 
evidence of arson. After daybreak, arson investigators returned to 
the location and found other evidence of arson that had not been 
visible a t  night; this, too, they appropriated. About three weeks 
later, state police fire marshals came back once again and discov- 
ered additional evidence. None of the entries and seizures had 
been given advance judicial authorization. The state supreme 
court ruled that a search warrant was required for any entry onto 
premises and for any seizure or evidence once a fire actually had 
been extinguished. The Supreme Court agreed with much, but 
not all, of the state court analysis. 
The Court's administrative search cases, including Barlow 's, 
Inc., establish the principle that the fourth amendment safe- 
guards citizens against arbitrary invasions by government offi- 
26. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 1825. 
27. Id. at 1826. 
28. 98 S. Ct. 1942 (1978). 
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cials, including fire inspectors, irrespective of whether an entry 
is intended to locate and abate a public nuisance or to perform a 
routine periodic inspection. The state argued, however, that an 
occupant who sets fire to his or her premises has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy, while an occupant who is a victim of arson 
will not object to official entries. The first premises, left open in 
Tyler, was later rejected in Mincey o. ArizonaB under analogous 
circumstances. The Court in Tyler reasoned that even if the con- 
cept of abandonment of privacy through criminal activity were 
theoretically correct, it would be of no help when arson has not 
been established at the time of official entry. The second prem- 
ise was also rejected in Tyler: victims indeed have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in fie-ravaged premises that forestall 
warrantless, nonconsensual entries, for on occasion they continue 
to live or work there, and often have personal property that can 
be salvaged. 
Consequently, the Court reasoned, searches by firefighters 
and arson investigators are within the coverage of the fourth 
amendment; there is no basis to differentiate their activities from 
those of others engaged in administrative inspections. Moreover, 
the Court rejected the argument that  a warrant requirement 
would be meaningless because nothing need be shown in support 
of a warrant application beyond the fact that a fire had occurred. 
To secure a warrant to investigate the cause of a fire, an official 
must show more than the bare fact that a fire has occurred. The 
magistrate's duty is to assure that the proposed search will be 
reasonable, a determination that requires inquiry into the need 
for the intrusion on the one hand, and the threat of disruption 
to the occupant on the other. . . . The number of prior entries, 
the scope of the search, the time of day when it is proposed to 
be made, the lapse of time since the fire, the continued use of 
the building, and the owner's efforts to secure it against intrud- 
ers might all be relevant facto~-s.30 
A magistrate "can perform the important function of preventing 
harassment by keeping that invasion to a minimum,"31 and a 
warrant serves to reassure property owners of the legality of an 
entry. 
Evidence discovered in the course of fighting a fire may, the 
Court assured, be used to support the issuance of a search or 
inspection warrant. A burning building clearly presents an exi- 
- - -- 
29. 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 8-19 supra). 
30. 98 S. Ct. at 1949. 
31. Id. 
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gency rendering an entry reasonable in fourth amendment terms; 
"it would defy reason to suppose that firemen must secure a 
warrant or consent before entering a burning structure to put out 
the blaze."32 Once lawfully on the premises, firemen may seize 
evidence in plain view. The Court disagreed, however, with the 
state court position that the need for a warrant arises "with the 
dousing of the last flame? Fire officials are under a duty to find 
the causes of fire, to prevent recurrences, to identify dangerous 
conditions, and to preserve evidence from intentional or acciden- 
tal destruction. The sooner they discharge these duties, the less 
will be their later interference with privacy and recovery efforts. 
"For these reasons," the Court announced, "officials need no war- 
rant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate 
the cause of a blaze after it has been exting~ished,"~~ although the 
nature of the premises and the conflagration governs reasonable- 
ness .35 
Similarly, the Court found no objection under the circum- 
stances to the fire officials' return a few hours later during day- 
light, since they could have remained constantly on the premises 
until that hour. It would have been but an idle formality to re- 
quire a warrant for such a return. Consequently, the inspection 
and seizure of evidence on the morning after the fire were consti- 
tutional. All later entries, however, required a warrant. 
In effect, Tyler delineated a spectrum of investigative pow- 
ers. Fire prevention activities seem to be within the scope of 
routine regulatory inspections governed by Barlow's, Inc.; these 
can no doubt be handled prograrnmati~ally.~~ Firefighters and 
investigators may enter premises without obtaining either a war- 
rant or consent during a fire; and once there, they may remain 
in, or return to, the premises for a reasonable time to investigate 
the cause of a fire. After that period expires, entries for further 
investigation must be pursuant to an investigative order or war- 
rant authorizing administrative inspection. If evidence is discov- 
ered during either phase, it may be seized and is admissible under 
the plain view doctrine. If by the time judicial authorization is 
sought, however, investigative personnel have probable cause to 
32. Id. at 1950. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1950 n.6. 
36. Compare the Tyler quotation at note 30 supra, with that from Barlow's, Inc. at 
note 26 supra. 
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believe arson has occurred, then the standards to be applied are 
those governing search warrants in criminal cases.37 
4. Process against third parties 
The position of the Court is clear that third parties must 
comply with lawfully issued process, even though innocent of 
criminal activity. In the controversial decision of Zurcher v. Stan- 
ford Daily,38 the Court rejected lower federal court endeavors to 
create hierarchies of process under the fourth amendment. 
Zurcher arose from the aftermath of a student demonstration 
during which several police officers were injured. There were indi- 
cations student newspaper photographers had taken pictures that 
might identify the assailants; one photograph taken on the occa- 
sion already had been published. Accordingly, the district attor- 
ney's office sought a search warrant to be executed in the offices 
of the newspaper, specifying negatives, films, and pictures show- 
ing the identified event. There was no allegation that any news- 
paper staff member was involved in the unlawful acts. The war- 
rant was executed, and nothing in the ensuing testimony showed 
that officers read documents or searched other than for the speci- 
fied material; the officers left without taking anything. 
Thereafter, newspaper staff members filed a Federal Civil 
Rights Act suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
the state officials responsible for the search. The federal district 
court granted declaratory relief. It held that a search warrant 
should not issue under the fourth amendment against one not 
suspected of criminal activity unless probable cause exists to be- 
lieve that the use of a subpoena duces tecum would be impractic- 
able. Moreover, it held that if the innocent object of a search were 
a newspaper, a search would be allowable under the first amend- 
ment only on a clear showing that important material would be 
destroyed or taken from the jurisdiction and that a restraining 
order would be futile to prevent it. The federal court of appeals 
affirmed per curiam. The Supreme Court reversed. 
To the Court majority, nothing on the face or in the history 
of the fourth amendment supported the lower courts' sweeping 
revision of practice under its terms. Since the amendment is con- 
cerned only with where and for what purpose search warrants 
may issue, not with the character of persons subjected to service, 
process clearly may issue against a third party. Culpability of an 
- -- 
37. 98 S. Ct. at  1951. 
38. 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978). 
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owner or possessor of property to be searched for or seized is not 
a condition to issuance of a warrant. To illustrate the principle, 
the Court noted its contraband vehicle search doctrine,39 which 
requires no preliminary arrest. Administrative searches and 
inspections also require no advance showing of ~r iminal i ty .~~ Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure makes no reference 
to arrest as a condition to execution of an otherwise properly 
issued search warrant. In short, there is nothing "in the Fourth 
Amendment indicating that absent probable cause to arrest a 
third party, resort must be had to a ~ubpoena."~~ Searches and 
seizures are independent of, not ancillary to, arrest and the proce- 
dures which follow. 
History aside, the majority Justices found unpersuasive the 
reasons advanced by the district court to support its reconstruc- 
tion of the fourth amendment. One who knows culpable evidence 
is secreted on his or her property and continues to hold it is 
culpable enough for purposes of a search warrant. Even absent 
that knowledge, service of a search warrant is sufficient in itself 
to create awareness of the fact, or to demonstrate a likelihood of 
the fact, that evidence has been secreted. When such an aware- 
ness exists, the Court reasoned, there is no basis to allow resist- 
ance to execution of a search warrant on the ground that a sub- 
poena duces tecum could have been used instead. 
Moreover, even assuming the use of a subpoena protects the 
personal privacy of third parties to some extent, that does not 
justify the risk that evidence will be recovered by its owner or 
otherwise lost or destroyed. Good faith on the part of a third party 
(who may or may not in fact be innocent of criminal wrongdoing) 
does not lessen the risk that evidence will be lost. Thus, nothing 
but the district court's unsubstantiated assumptions supported a 
change in tradition. Finally, in the Court's analysis, a search 
warrant affords more protection to individual privacy than does 
a subpoena because the latter issues with no supporting data and 
without a judicial order while relatively concrete information 
must support a search warrant application. 
The Court also rejected the proposition that newspaper or 
other media premises are governed by a special standard. The 
lower courts had built a special rule on several first-amendment- 
related concerns: (1) searches are sufficiently disruptive to inter- 
39. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
40. See, e.g., statements of the Court quoted at notes 26, 30 supra. 
41. 98 S. Ct. at 1978. 
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fere with timely publication; (2) confidential sources of informa- 
tion will dry up and press investigations taper off when sources 
fear that media files will be available for official inspection; (3) 
reporters will not record or preserve their recollections if later 
inspection is possible; (4) editorial processes will be impeded by 
a fear of disclosure of internal deliberations; and (5) the media 
will resort to self-censorship to conceal the possession of informa- 
tion of possible interest to the police. The majority opinion, how- 
ever, noted that magistrates can, by applying traditional fourth 
amendment requirements, control the issuance and the scope of 
warrants to prevent the consequences feared by the newspapers. 
In Zurcher itself the limits were precise and were observed by the 
police. The paucity of federal search warrants issued against the 
media suggested to the Court a present lack of abuse;42 if abuse 
should appear, however, the majority concluded that the courts 
would be competent to deal with it at that time. 
Finally, the Court disagreed with the newspaper's contention 
that issuance of search warrants for evidence to be used in a 
criminal trial works a prohibited prior restraint. No such effect 
occurred or was threatened on the facts of Zurcher. Accordingly, 
the Court declined to approve any doctrinal system that would 
require the use of subpoenas as a general rule if evidence is held 
by the media or that would demand notice and a hearing before 
search warrants could issue. 
A like philosophy informs the Court's decision in United 
States v. LaSalle National Bank43 that third parties cannot resist 
IRS civil process that may turn up evidence supporting either 
.civil or criminal tax fraud liability. In LaSalle Bank, an IRS 
agent conducted a fraud investigation which supported a suspi- 
cion that criminal conduct was present, but the case had not yet 
been submitted to the Department of Justice with a request for 
prosecution. An IRS summons covering some of the taxpayer's 
records under investigation issued against the bank, which re- 
sisted on advice of counsel. During subsequent district court pro- 
ceedings to enforce the summons, the bank and the taxpayer 
asserted that the IRS agent had admitted the summons was 
strictly related to criminal investigation, so that no civil investi- 
gatory purpose underlay it. On that basis the district court re- 
fused to compel compliance with the summons. The court of ap- 
peals affirmed, but found that the district court had reached a 
42. Id. at 1982. 
43. 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978). 
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factual determination, not a legal conclusion, in deciding that the 
process was for a criminal investigatory purpose, so that review 
was limited to application of a clearly erroneous legal standard. 
The Supreme Court reversed. 
The 1978 decision elaborates on an earlier holding44 where the 
Court rejected a contention that an IRS summons was unlawful 
because a criminal prosecution might have ensued, on the basis 
that Congress had authorized the use of such process to investi- 
gate potentially criminal conduct. Under the LaSalle Bank facts, 
there was a clear possibility of criminal penalties, but the agency 
could have opted to pursue civil fraud penalties as well. The 
Court noted that "Congress has created a law enforcement sys- 
tem in which criminal and civil elements are inherently inter- 
twined."45 Therefore, IRS summonses may be used in connection 
with either form of investigation regardless of the particular 
agent's subjective intent. The Court held, however, that after a 
recommendation of criminal prosecution to the Department of 
Justice (when there begins an identifiable separation, although 
not a complete divorce, between criminal and civil proceedings), 
it would be improper to use IRS summons machinery to secure 
evidence useful in prosecution since that would essentially con- 
vert the administrative system into a form of criminal discovery. 
Moreover, until that moment, IRS authority must be exercised 
in good faith; a recommendation of prosecution cannot be de- 
layed for the purpose of gathering evidence to be used by the 
government prosecutor. The motivation of a particular IRS intel- 
ligence agent does not control, however, because of the adminis- 
trative review required by IRS regulations before a recommenda- 
tion of prosecution can be transmitted. Neither the intelligence 
agent's entry into the investigation nor his or her subjective in- 
tent signals that there has been abuse. 
As a result, the question whether an investigation has solely 
criminal purposes must be answered only by an examination of 
the institutional posture of the IRS . . . . [Tlhis means that 
those opposing enforcement of a summons do bear the burden 
to disprove the actual existence of a valid civil tax determina- 
tion or collection purpose by the Service . . . . 
Without doubt, this burden is a heavy 
But such an inquiry can and should be made because the Court 
44. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). 
45. 98 S. Ct. at 2363. 
46. Id. at 2367. 
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will "not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to 
the Justice Department when there is an institutional commit- 
ment to make the referral and the Service merely would like to 
gather additional evidence for the prose~ution."~~ On the LaSalle 
Bank record, there had been no recommendation and no showing 
of delay for the purpose of gathering criminal evidence; therefore, 
the Court held, the district court should have enforced the sum- 
mons. 
As in Franks v. Dela~are, '~ the dissent was most concerned 
over the procedural implications of the majority ruling. In the 
dissenting Justices' thinking, it would have been sufficient to rest 
with the question of whether a referral to the Department of 
Justice had occurred by the time process issued. The dissenters 
feared that the Court had opened up "endless discovery proceed- 
ings and ultimate frustration of the fair administration" of the 
tax laws.49 
In addition to Zurcher and LaSalle Bank, a third concep- 
tually related holding is found in the United States v .  New York 
Telephone Co. 50 decision that telephone communication carriers 
can be required by court order to aid in the installation of pen 
 register^.^' The Court concluded that pen register devices are not 
within the coverage of the federal eavesdropping statute,52 that 
under the fourth amendment a search warrant may issue author- 
izing the installation of such a device, and that under the so- 
called All Writs a court can issue to federal law enforcement 
agents any order necessary to effectuate the issuance of a search 
warrant. Absolute necessity is not a prerequisite, the Court rea- 
soned, but simply the fact that an order is "appropriate to effec- 
tuate and prevent the frustration of orders . . . previously issued 
in [a court's] exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained?' Judi- 
cial power may be exercised against persons who are not parties 
to litigation or not otherwise engaged in wrongdoing if they can 
47. Id. a t  2367-68. 
48. 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 1-7 supra); see text 
accompanying note 7 supra. 
49. 98 S. Ct. a t  2369 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
50. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
51. In the words of the Court, "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the 
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electric impulses caused when the dial 
on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not 
indicate whether calls are actually completed." Id. a t  161 n.1. 
52. 18 U.S.C. 5 2518(1) (1976) (discussed further in text accompanying notes 59-64 
infra). 
53. 28 U.S.C. (j 1651(a) (1976). 
54. 434 U.S. a t  172. 
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frustrate the implementation of a court order. Under the circum- 
stances, the telephone company had few equities, since without 
the meager use of its resources required under the district court 
order the purpose of the warrant would have been entirely frus- 
trated. The company, as a "highly regulated public utility with 
a duty to serve the had, in the Court's view, no substan- 
tial interest in not providing assistance. Moreover, the company 
admitted that it regularly used the same kind of device to check 
on billing operations and detect fraud, and indeed had offered to 
supply the FBI with sufficient information to allow the Bureau 
to install its own pen registers. The company was to be reim- 
bursed at standard rates, so that it would sustain no economic 
loss. Finally, since Congress has authorized orders directed to a 
communications common carrier to furnish facilities for an inter- 
c e p t i ~ n , ~ ~  the company could hardly resist a like order under the 
All Writs Act which would accomplish a far lesser invasion of 
privacy. To prohibit the district court order, the Court reasoned, 
would frustrate a ciear indication by Congress that pen registers 
are lawful and would enable a public utility to prevent successful 
detection and conviction of those who use its facilities unlawfully. 
Against the background of the Court's earlier rulings that 
holders of documents cannot resist warrants, subpoenas, or sum- 
monses on third-party privilege  ground^,^ Zurcher, LaSalle 
Bank, and New York Telephone Co. make it clear that those on 
whom judicial process is served have only the most narrow basiss8 
on which to justify noncompliance. If this phalanx of rulings is 
to be broken, it will have to be through legislative amendments 
or the construction of a more beneficient rule for defendants 
under state law. 
5. Electronic surveillance 
As indicated above, the Court ruled in United States v .  New 
York Telephone CO.~' that pen registers are not within the cover- 
age of federal eavesdropping law. This was clear, in the Court's 
view, from the preenactment history60 as well as the language of 
55. Id. at 174. 
56. 18 U.S.C. Ej 2518(4) (1976). 
57. Andresen v.  Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 
(1976); see George, United States Supreme Court Term 1975-76: Criminal Law Decisions, 
23 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 12-17 (1976). 
58. Essentially, the only available challenge is to the regularity of the process on its 
face. 
59. 434 U.S. 159 (1977). 
60. See id. at 167-68. 
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the statute itself. Pen registers do not intercept, because they 
neither capture the contents of a communication nor determine 
that a call has been completed; they merely record the fact of 
dialing and the number dialed. They do not achieve "aural ac- 
quisition"" of anything, since they merely detect changes in 
electrical current created by dialing or pressing telephone but- 
tons. Any challenge, therefore, to the use of pen registers must 
come directly under the fourth amendment. Federill Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41(b) in its enumeration of possible objects 
of warrant issuancea does not, the Court said, exhaust all possi- 
bilities. The Court's decision in KatzU that telephone conversa- 
tions are within the ambit of the fourth amendment confirmed 
that Rule 41 can extend to "seizures of intangible items such as 
dial impulses recorded by pen registers as well as tangible 
items."64 
In Scott u. United States,65 the Court dealt with a somewhat 
more recondite, although hardly unimportant, aspect of federal 
eavesdropping legislation, namely the minimization require- 
ment." A federal district court suppressed all wiretap and deriva- 
tive evidence relating to a narcotics conspiracy because the 
agents failed to minimize interference with noncriminal commu- 
nications, as evidenced by the fact that almost all calls were 
intercepted while only forty percent were actually narcotics re- 
lated. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the district court 
should not have used a percentage test to ascertain minimization; 
instead, the agents' efforts to minimize under the particular cir- 
cumstances were the key to whether their conduct was reasona- 
ble. On remand, the district court again suppressed the evidence 
because it found the agents had not sufficiently endeavored to 
minimize. Once more the court of appeals reversed. The defen- 
dant was convicted at the trial which followed, and the appellate 
court and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
The defendant argued that a finding of a good faith effort to 
comply with warrant requirements is essential to a holding of 
61. Interception under the federal statute is defined as "the aural acquisition of the 
contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, 
or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976). 
62. The rule covers "(1) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a 
criminal offense; (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally pos- 
sessed; [and] (3) property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as 
the means of committing a criminal offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b). 
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
64. 434 U.S. at 170. 
65. 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978). 
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976). 
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actual compliance, so that a failure to make good faith attempts 
at minimizing interference violates an underlying judicial order 
authorizing eavesdropping. The Court, however, endorsed the 
government analysis that a finding of noncompliance must be 
made in light of objective circumstances; subjective intent is sig- 
nificant only in determining whether the exclusionary rule is to 
be invoked after a violation has been established. Thus, in Terry 
v. Ohiom the key issue was whether, by an external standard, the 
frisk was reasonable. Similarly in United States v. Robinson," as 
long as the search incident to custodial arrest was objectively 
justifiable, it did not matter that the searching officer's state of 
mind did not correspond to the abstract assumption underlying 
the rule (that is, that the arrestee might be armed and dangerous, 
or in possession of evidence of crime). The Court reasoned that 
the minimization requirement does not require a different result. 
Congressional use of the word "conducted" in the statutea9 "made 
it clear that the focus was to be on the agents' actions not their 
motives. "70 
On the Scott facts, the trial court's use of a percentage test 
to determine minimization was improper. Some calls were very 
brief, and others were from persons not earlier identified to be 
innocent callers. The tapped telephones also were in a private 
apartment believed to be the hub of a narcotics network; they 
were not public telephones from which only occasional unlawful 
transactions might be conducted. Furthermore, the Court noted 
that the time during the course of interception at  which a call is 
recorded is significant; at an early stage all calls may need to be 
intercepted to establish "categories of nonpertinent calls which 
will not be intercepted thereafter. On balance, the majority 
found no basis upon which to overturn the court of appeals' deter- 
mination from the trial court record that the minimization re- 
quirement had been met. 
6. Stop-and- frisk 
In Pennsylvania v. Mirnrn~,'~ the only stop-and-frisk decision 
of the Term, the Supreme Court overturned a state supreme court 
67. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (leading stop-and-frisk decision). 
68. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
69. 18 U.S.C. Q 2518(5) (1976). The statute requires that any interception "be con- 
ducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise 
subject to interception." Id. 
70. Scott v. United States, 98 S. Ct. at 1724. 
71. Id. at 1725. 
72. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam, with three Justices dissenting). 
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ruling that officers violated the fourth amendment when they 
ordered vehicle occupants to alight after valid traffic arrests. 
After Mimms had left his vehicle, officers observed a suspicious 
bulge which, on further investigation, proved to be an unlawfully 
possessed handgun. Mimms was prosecuted and convicted of 
carrying a concealed weapon. The state supreme court reversed 
the conviction under the derivative evidence rule because the 
officer did not have probable cause to order Mimms from the 
automobile. All observations and the physical search, in the state 
court's view, were tainted by the unlawful order. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
Reasonableness, the Court observed, always involves a bal- 
ance between public interest and individual personal security. 
There was nothing improper in the inception of the transaction, 
the Court reasoned, for the officers had observed a clear criminal 
violation in their presence. Even though nothing suggested that 
Mimms himself posed an apparent danger to officers, it was not 
an unreasonable practice to order all drivers thus stopped from 
their vehicles, since that would render them fully visible and help 
forestall assaults on officers. The Court felt that although not all 
assaults on officers approaching vehicles occur in connection with 
traffic arrests, enough do occur to render the practice in such a 
setting reasonable. The majority also noted that there is physical 
danger to officers if they are required to stand at  or near the 
driver's side of vehicles where traffic may be passing, a danger 
that can be obviated by requiring drivers to move to the shoulder 
of a road. In contrast to this enhancement of officers' safety, the 
Court found the inconvenience to drivers to be minimal, and thus 
suitably ignored by legal doctrine. The Court concluded that 
"[wlhat is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when 
balanced against legitimate concerns for the officer's safety."73 
7. The fourth amendment exclusionary rule 
Mention has already been made about the Court's asides on 
the exclusionary rule: for example, that it extends to "substantial 
and deliberate"  violation^;^^ and that officers' subjective states of 
mind are not to control in determining whether an IRS summons 
properly issued75 or whether minimization has occurred during 
73. Id. at 111. 
74. Franks v. Delaware, 98 S .  Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978). 
75. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978) (discussed in text 
accompanying notes 43-49 supra). 
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eavesdr~pping,~"ut only in deciding whether the exclusionary 
rule should be invoked after a violation has been established 
under objective criteria. The Court, however, dealt directly with 
one aspect of the rule-its applicability to witnesses whose ident- 
ity is discovered through an unreasonable search or seizure. 
In United States v. C e c ~ o l i n i , ~ ~  a local police officer, during 
a social visit to a clerk in defendant's shop, casually looked in an 
envelope beside the cash register and discovered gambling memo- 
randa. He asked the clerk its source and was informed that defen- 
dant had left it to be delivered to a named person. Afterward, the 
officer's discovery was reported to an FBI agent without full men- 
tion of the circumstances of that discovery. Four months later, 
the FBI agent interviewed the clerk at her home and obtained an 
offer from her to cooperate with investigating officers. The defen- 
dant thereafter gave sworn testimony before a federal grand jury 
that he had never taken policy bets in his shop. In an ensuing 
perjury prosecution the clerk was called as a principal govern- 
ment witness. The district court found, on the strength of the 
clerk's testimony, that perjury had been committed, but subse- 
quently granted a defense motion to suppress the testimony and 
set aside the guilty verdict. The government appealed unsuccess- 
fully to the court of appeals, which affirmed because the causal 
connection between the unlawful search and the witness' testi- 
mony was "both straight and uninterr~pted,"~~ with no indication 
that discovery of her identity was inevitable. The Supreme Court 
reversed. 
The majority Justices agreed, contrary to the government's 
assertion, that the Wong S u n  testTg applies to live witnesses. How- 
ever, the statement in Wong S u n  that there is no difference be- 
tween physical and verbal evidenceR0 has been substantially qual- 
ified by later decisions of the Court. Wong S u n  involved a puta- 
tive defendant, while Ceccolini was concerned with a prosecution 
witness. Thus, the court of appeals "was simply wrong in con- 
cluding that if the road were uninterrupted, its length was imma- 
terial." Length, the Court held, "is material, as are certain other 
76. Scott v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying 
notes 65-71 supra). 
77. 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
78. Id. at 273 (quoting 542 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
79. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U S .  471 (1963). Under Wong Sun, the test is 
whether "the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of 
the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' " Id. at 487 
(quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). 
80. Id. at 486. 
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factors . . . to which the court gave insufficient   eight."^' 
The Court then reviewed its statements as to the limitations 
on application of the exclusionary rule in grand jury proceedingsu2 
and its use for impeachment purposes,R3 reiterating that the rule 
does not bar all evidence against all persons.u4 Controls on stand- 
ing to invoke the rule also are relevant." All these principles 
supported the Court's conclusion that there is no per se exclusion- 
ary rule under the fourth amendment. 
Under the Court's analysis, the degree of free will exercised 
by a witness is important in determining the extent to which "the 
basic purpose of the exclusionary rule will be advanced by its 
app l i ca t i~n . "~~  The greater a witness' willingness to testify, the 
greater the likelihood he or she will be discovered by legal means, 
and the smaller the incentive to use illegal means. The Court 
noted, however, that a contrary analysis might govern if police 
had acted unlawfully specifically to discover potential wit- 
nes~es.~ '  Nevertheless, in most instances, illegality of discovery 
may well play no role in a witness' decision to cooperate with the 
prosecution. 
Moreover, the Court recognized that "[r]ules which dis- 
qualify knowledgeable witnesses from testifying a t  trial are . . . 
'serious obstructions to the ascertainment of t r~th. '"~TJnder the 
standards laid down in Michigan v. Tucker,ug courts ought not 
readily prevent witnesses from testifying; rather, "a closer, more 
direct link between the illegality and that kind of testimony is 
required."" The Court did not intend to suggest that witness 
testimony is better than demonstrative evidence (the converse 
may well be true); but "[a]ttenuation analysis, appropriately 
concerned with the differences between live-witness testimony 
and inanimate evidence, can consistently focus on [the voluntar- 
iness and knowledgeability of witnesses] with respect to the for- 
mer, but on different factors with respect to the latter?' 
In so holding, the Court reaffirmed a somewhat hoary state- 
81. 435 U.S. at 275 (emphasis in original). 
82. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
83. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). 
84. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
85. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
86. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276. 
87. Id. at 276 n.4. 
88. Id. at 277 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE $ 71 
(1954)). 
89. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
90. 435 U.S. at 278. 
91. Id. at 278-79. 
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ment that "[a] criminal prosecution is more than a game in 
which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost 
merely because its officers have not played according to rule?"' 
Thus, "[tlhe penalties visited upon the Government, and in turn 
upon the public, because its officers have violated the law must 
bear some relation to the purposes which the law is to serve."93 
There was overwhelming evidence in Ceccolini that the witness 
exercised free will in deciding to testify and was in no way coerced 
to that decision by the local officer's discovery of the policy me- 
moranda: substantial time elapsed between illegal discovery and 
an official approach to the witness, FBI agents were already 
aware of the clerk's relationship to the defendant, there was no 
indication of an improper motive on the h a 1  officer's part in 
entering the shop and examining the envelope, and there was no 
evidence of an intent to discover the witness. "Application of the 
exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the slightest 
deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer such as [this]," the 
Court reasoned, and the burden of permanently silencing the 
witness "is too great for an evenhanded system of law enforce- 
ment to bear in order to secure such a speculative and very likely 
negligible deterrent effect."g4 Thus, the Court majority confirmed 
its analytical premise, evident for the past four Terms, that the 
exclusionary rule is no longer an automatic or mechanical pro- 
cess, but rather a dynamic one that involves weighing the possible 
deterrent impact of excluding evidence against the need of the 
judicial system for as broad an array of probative evidence as 
possible to support a proper adjudication. 
8. Eyewitness identification proceedings 
In Moore v. I l l i n ~ i s , ~ ~  the Court reiterated its doctrine that 
identification procedures after commencement of formal proceed- 
ings are governed by more protective standards than those for 
earlier identification measures. A rape victim, who had had only 
a few seconds to view her assailant's face, was taken by an officer 
to a courtroom in which the defendant (whose photograph was 
one of two or three she had selected) was being preliminarily 
examined to determine detention or release pending indictment. 
Moore was not represented by counsel a t  the time. The victim 
92. Id. at 279 (quoting McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927)). 
93. Id. at 279. 
94. Id. at 280. 
95. 434 U.S. 220 (1977). 
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identified Moore as her assailant. After indictment, defense coun- 
sel moved to suppress the identification evidence, but the motion 
was denied on the basis that there was an independent source for 
the identification. An ensuing conviction was affirmed in the 
state supreme court. An application for federal habeas corpus 
also proved unsuccessful. In reviewing the action, however, the 
Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court's position in its Wade v. United Statesg6 and 
Gilbert v. Californiag7 decisions is clear: After a criminal case has 
been commenced the right to counsel governs every critical stage, 
including identification proceedings. In Kirby v. Illin~is,~"he 
right to counsel did not attach to an identification proceeding 
because judicial criminal proceedings had not been initiated. In 
Moore, the Court held that the preliminary hearing marked the 
commencement of such proceedings and, therefore, the state's 
position that indictment is needed before the Wade-Gilbert rule 
governs was erroneous. The fact tha t  the defendants in both 
Wade and Gilbert were the subjects of lineup proceedings while 
Moore involved a one-on-one confrontation failed to influence the 
Court because, if anything, a confrontation poses a greater risk 
of misidentification than a lineup. 
The Court reasoned that the fact the identification was made 
during a judicial proceeding did not lessen the need for counsel. 
Thus, sixth amendment considerations under Wade-Gilbert oper- 
ated fully in Moore's situation. The officer had told the victim she 
was to view a suspect, and she had previously had but a brief 
opportunity to see her attacker. Counsel might have forestalled 
some of this suggestiveness. The Court enumerated the following 
actions defense counsel might have taken a t  that time: (1) re- 
quest a continuance until a proper lineup could be conducted; (2) 
seek to excuse the victim from the courtroom while evidence bear- 
ing on probable cause was received; (3) ask that the defendant 
be seated among spectators when the victim attempted an identi- 
fication; and (4) cross-examine the complainant before her iden- 
tification hardened. Of course, whether such requests are to be 
granted is a matter within trial court discretion, but none is im- 
proper per se. 
The Court ruled that Moore's sixth amendment rights thus 
had been violated. Under the circumstances, the state courts 
erred in invoking the independent source test to justify the vic- 
96. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
97. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
98. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
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tim's trial testimony. She testified not merely to the identity of 
defendant as her attacker, but also to the fact that she had so 
identified him at  the preliminary hearing. This, the Court said, 
was the direct exploitation of an improper identification proceed- 
ing which Gilbert forbids. On remand, the state court was di- 
rected to determine whether the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
9. Interrogation 
The search and seizure aspects of Mincey u. Arizonag9 have 
already been canvassed. The Court also considered a dimension 
of confessions law in that case. Mincey was questioned in a hospi- 
tal intensive care unit. He had tubes in his throat so that all his 
responses to questions had to be written. He was in much pain, 
under sedation, and apparently slipped into unconsciousness a t  
various times while the interrogating officer was present. 
Miranda warnings were given, but Mincey repeatedly indicated 
that he wanted to speak with an attorney before answering cer- 
tain questions. The state courts drew upon Harris u. New YorklOO 
and Oregon v. Hassl" for the doctrine that statements violating 
Miranda rules can be used to impeach. Since they also found the 
confession to be voluntary, the state courts concluded that it was 
proper to allow the trial jury to hear Mincey's confession after he 
had testified in his own behalf. The Supreme Court disagreed. 
Any use of an involuntary confession, the Court said, consti- 
tutes a per se denial of due process, irrespective of other valid 
evidence to support the conviction. Moreover, the Court was not 
bound to accept the state court determination that a confession 
was voluntary. Under the circumstances in Mincey, "[tlhe 
statements at  issue were . . . the result of virtually continuous 
questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge 
of consciousness,"~~ not the product of a free and rational choice. 
"[Tlhe undisputed evidence makes clear that  Mincey wanted 
not to answer [the detective]. But Mincey was weakened by pain 
and shock, isolated from family, friends and legal counsel, and 
barely conscious, and his will was simply overborne."lo3 Hence, 
the Court concluded, his statements could not be used even for 
purposes of impeachment. 
99. 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 9-19 supra). 
100. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
101. 420 US. 714 (1975). 
102. Mincey v. Arizona, 98 S. Ct. a t  2418. 
103. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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B. Pretrial Bocedure 
1. Plea negotiations 
The stance of the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes1" is clear: plea bargaining, or negotiating, is a legitimate 
process. Hayes was charged with forgery in state court. During 
plea negotiations the prosecutor indicated he would recommend 
a five-year sentence if Hayes would plea guilty, but that if no 
guilty plea were forthcoming on those terms he would seek a 
habitual criminal indictment against Hayes. Hayes ultimately 
refused to plead guilty and the prosecutor acted as he had said 
he would, properly within the terms of the state's recidivism law. 
Hayes' conviction and resulting life sentence under the charges 
were affirmed in the state appellate court, and a federal district 
court denied habeas corpus relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed, 
however, on the premise that the prosecutor's conduct violated 
the rule of Blackledge v. Perry,lo5 which it interpreted to protect 
defendants "from the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discre- 
tion."lo6 The Supreme Court reversed. 
Hayes was well aware of the prosecutor's intentions before 
indictment under the recidivism law; hence, the case involved no 
additional charging after the defendant had refused to plead 
guilty to a single original charge. The situation was the same, the 
Court concluded, as if the habitual offender indictment were al- 
ready pending and the prosecutor had promised to drop it if 
Hayes pleaded. Nevertheless, the court of appeals appeared to 
hold that due process is violated if a prosecutor's charging deci- 
sion is governed by what he or she intends to gain during plea 
bargaining. The Supreme Court did not validate such doctrine. 
The Court has already indicated that plea negotiation is 
important to the orderly functioning of the criminal justice sys- 
tem.lo7 For this reason counsel plays a vital role in plea negotia- 
tionslO%nd plea agreements will be enforced.log The court of ap- 
peals erred when it held the contents of a plea offer can directly 
violate due process. Vindictiveness under North Carolina v. 
Pearcell" and Blackledge v. Perry"' has to do with unilateral in- 
104. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
105. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
106. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
107. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). 
108. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970). 
109. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
110. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
111. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 
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fliction of adverse consequences on defendants who have exer- 
cised a right of appeal; it bears no relationship, the Court as- 
serted, to give-and-take negotiations during plea bargaining, in 
which no element of punishment or retaliation is present. 
The Court recognized that each side has its own interests to 
promote in plea negotiations. "Defendants advised by competent 
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are pre- 
sumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to prosecu- 
torial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false self- 
condemnation. " l 2  Thus, to accept legitimate plea bargaining 
necessarily is to reject "any notion that a guilty plea is involun- 
tary in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result 
of the bargaining process."l13 Consequently, although confronting 
a defendant with the alternative of more severe punishment if 
trial is sought may affect a decision to plead, "by tolerating and 
encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily 
accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the 
prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the 
defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty."l14 
In sum, selectivity in law enforcement is not bad as long as 
it does not rest on an unjustifiable standard like race or religion. 
In the Court's view, to include a desire to induce a guilty plea 
within the concept of "unjustifiable standard" would "contradict 
the very premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining 
itself. " Woreover, such a holding "could only invite unhealthy 
subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back 
into the shadows from which it has so recently emerged."l16 The 
Court recognized the potential for abuse in granting broad prose- 
cutorial discretion, but noted that "there are undoubtedly consti- 
tutional limits upon its exercise."l17 Those due process limits were 
not, however, transgressed in Hayes' case. 
2. Federal jurisdiction 
The Court rendered three interesting decisions delineating 
the jurisdictional powers of Indian tribes, as well as the reach of 
112. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 364. 
115. Id. at 365. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. This appears to be the first intimation by the Court that prosecutorial discre- 
tion can be attacked on due process grounds. 
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federal criminal laws in relationship to state legislation. In 
United States v. John, l lR  the Court ruled that the Major Crimes 
Act,l19 which covers certain crimes committed in "Indian coun- 
try," extends to a part of Mississippi where Choctaw Indians have 
lived for more than a century. John was convicted under the Act, 
but his federal conviction was reversed on the ground that the 
situs was not in Indian country. In the interim, Mississippi con- 
victed John of a crime arising from the same transaction, and the 
state supreme court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review 
in both cases. After an exhaustive inquiry into the history of the 
federal treatment of the Choctaws, the Court concluded that the 
area within the State of Mississippi indeed constituted "Indian 
country" within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, the Court 
held, the state's criminal jurisdiction was preempted by the fed- 
eral statute. 
The other two decisions dealt with in personam tribal juris- 
diction. In the first, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 120 non- 
Indian defendants charged with criminal and traffic violations on 
a tribal reservation sought federal habeas corpus based on the 
tribal court's lack of jurisdiction over non-Indians. Relief was 
denied. The Supreme Court reversed. It found nothing to indicate 
that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians had been reserved 
under treaties with any Indian nation, including the Suquamish. 
And, since tribal courts were created by congressional action, 
they have only the jurisdiction specifically allocated to them, 
which does not extend to non-Indians. "By submitting to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes there- 
fore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of 
the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress."121 
Despite the facts that tribal courts have become more sophisti- 
cated and federal legislation guarantees defendants before them 
a number of basic procedural rights, the Court maintained that 
remedies must come from Congress even though crimes by non- 
Indians on tribal lands pose a real problem. Meanwhile, there is 
no tribal jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendant. 
The second decision, United States v. Wheeler, 122 considered 
the correlative issue of criminal jurisdiction over tribal members. 
A Navajo Indian was first convicted in tribal courts of contribut- 
118. 98 S: Ct. 2541 (1978). 
119. 18 U.S.C. 6 1153 (1976). 
120. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
121. Id. at 210. 
122. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
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ing to the delinquency of a minor and later prosecuted in federal 
district court for statutory rape for the same act. The district 
court dismissed the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, an 
action affirmed by the court of appeals because both courts were 
entities of the same sovereign. The Supreme Court reversed. 
Indian tribes have always had sovereign power over their own 
members, and at least a limited sovereignty continues until either 
relinquished by treaty or abrogated by act of Congress. Neither 
event had occurred in the case of the Navajo Nation. The Court 
found no constitutional difficulty in the fact that, under 
Oliphant, tribal courts have no jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Jurisdiction over tribal members has continued unabated, and 
with good reason, since tribes have a significant interest in main- 
taining orderly relationships among members and in preserving 
tribal customs. Federal preemption, the Court reasoned might 
well conflict with needs of tribal self-government. Accordingly, 
the concept of dual sovereignty continues to control; double jeop- 
ardy does not bar a subsequent federal prosecution. 
C. Trial Proceedings 
1. Jury trial 
A jury cannot constitutionally number fewer than six per- 
sons. The Court's judgment to that effect in Ballew v. Georgia123 
was unanimous, but there was no majority opinion expressing a 
clearly controlling rationale. Justices Blackmun and Stevens 
pointed to a number of possible defects suggested by scholarly 
research in smaller juries: (1) they impede effective group deliber- 
ations; (2) the risk of erroneous convictions increases; (3) vari- 
ances in results among different juries increase to the detriment 
of defendants; and (4) minority juror participation is reduced. 
Furthermore, they noted that research methodological problems 
may mask other potential disparities between verdicts of large 
and small juries. They perceived no differences in these phenom- 
ena based on the seriousness of the offense charged, and no rem- 
edy in the fact that unanimity of verdict is required. Absent 
empirical data to support the validity of five-person jury determi- 
nations and appreciable savings in court time, they would allow 
no reduction below six persons. Justice White concurred on the 
sole ground that juries of five or fewer fail to represent fairly a 
community.lu Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
123. 435 US. 223 (1978). 
124. Id. at 245 (White, J., concurring). This rationale is presumably derived from the 
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Justice Rehnquist, thought that a line had to be drawn some- 
where and that six was as good as five, but he disagreed with the 
premise that states must follow all aspects of federal practice as 
Justice Blackmun ass~med.~~Vust ices  Brennan, Stewart, and 
Marshall concurred in the Court's judgment, but would have 
barred retrial because of their belief that the Georgia obscenity 
statute under which Ballew had been tried was unconstitu- 
tionally broad.lZR Because only three states have allowed criminal 
trial juries smaller than six persons, the impact of the decision is 
not great, and the lack of a controlling doctrinal statement of no 
particular moment. 
2. Double jeopardy 
The Term saw significant elaborations upon, and in some 
respects changes in the scope of, the double jeopardy rule. In Crist 
v. Bretz, the Court held that the Constitution requires jeopardy 
to attach in jury cases when a jury is empaneled to begin trial. 
Although in federal courts the point a t  which jeopardy attaches 
differs in bench and jury trials, the state had applied the same 
rule to both: jeopardy was deemed to attach when the first wit- 
ness was sworn. Consequently, it  had not barred retrial when, 
after the jury was sworn, a mistrial was granted upon motion of 
the prosecution to allow a proper information to be filed after 
amendment had been disallowed by the trial court. The Supreme 
Court thought no such variation from federal practice was consti- 
tutionally allowable even though its roots lay in the English com- 
mon law. The Court found no room for a balancing test turning 
on how far trial has advanced, as the federal government had 
argued as amicus curiae.128 Since the federal doctrine "protects 
the defendant's interest in retaining a chosen jury," the Court 
reasoned that "the federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the 
jury is empaneled and sworn is an integral part of the constitu- 
tional guarantee against double jeopardy."12g Thus, defendants 
have a right to their original jury unless they waive it. 
The Wheeler case130 is an exotic invocation of the dual sover- 
constitutional standard for obscenity upon which the petitioner's conviction depended. 
Miller v .  California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
125. Id. at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring). 
126. Id. at 246 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
127. 98 S. Ct. 2156 (1978). 
128. Id. at 2162 n.16. 
129. Id. at 2162. 
130. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying 
note 122 supra). 
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eignty concept within double jeopardy, extending the doctrine to 
sequential federal and tribal prosecutions. The same approach 
applies between the states and the federal government; each sov- 
ereign may prosecute an act or transaction which violates its 
criminal laws.131 As an administrative matter, however, the De- 
partment of Justice has instructed federal prosecutors not to re- 
plicate a state prosecution unless there are compelling federal 
reasons to do so. The 1977-1978 Term saw a more formal endorse- 
ment of the so-called Petite policy,ln although not to the extent 
of rejecting the fundamental dual sovereignty doctrine. 
In Rinaldi u. United States, lS3 the federal prosecutor told the 
trial court that he had been instructed to pursue vigorously a 
federal prosecution, despite a state conviction already entered in 
the same transaction, seemingly for fear that the state conviction 
might be overturned in the state appellate courts. On appeal of 
the federal conviction, the government acknowledged that the 
Petite policy in fact had been ignored and the court of appeals 
remanded so that the government might move to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a). On remand the trial 
court refused to grant the motion because it came after comple- 
tion of trial and the prosecutor had shown bad faith in the origi- 
nal prosecution of the case. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. 
The Petite policy, the Court reasoned, promotes "efficient 
management of limited Executive resources and encourages local 
responsibility in law enforcement."134 Moreover, the executive 
policy underlying the Petite regulation protects interests which 
would be of constitutional significance were it not for the dual 
sovereignty doctrine. 
In the Court's view, the trial court's concern with the prose- 
cution's bad faith was misplaced in the setting of a Rule 48(a) 
motion. There was no bad faith a t  the time of the motion to 
dismiss, even though there might have been when trial was 
commenced. The motion to dismiss could not be viewed as 
"clearly contrary to manifest public interest."135 There was noth- 
ing to suggest that the defendant would have been prejudiced by 
131. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 
(1959). 
132. This policy is referred to by the Court as the Petite policy, named after an earlier 
decision in which its existence was acknowledged. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 
(1960). 
133. 434 U.S. 22 (1977). 
134. Id. at 27. 
135. Id. at 30 (quoting United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
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the government's motion as might have occurred, for example, if 
the underlying purpose were to harass through charging, dismiss- 
ing, and recharging.13R Since no proper societal interest would be 
served by punishing the defendant a second time, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it refused to grant the prosecution's 
motion to dismiss. 
The constitutional concern over double punishment also 
impacts on statutory construction. Even though there may not be 
a direct constitutional infringement in treating two offenses aris- 
ing from the same set of operative facts as different crimes,13' 
congressional intent to allow repeated punishment based on a 
single occurrence or series of related occurrences must be clear, 
the Court said in Simpson v. United States.138 Following the can- 
ons of statutory construction that ambiguities are to be resolved 
in favor of defendants and that special statutes are to be preferred 
over general, the Court ruled that the penalties for using firearms 
to commit felonies13g and those for committing aggravated bank 
robberylM could not be imposed cumulatively if they are based 
upon the same events. Under the circumstances, dual prosecution 
seemed to the Court to have violated published Department of 
Justice interpretations of these statutes. Even if the government's 
position had changed, the original version was consonant with 
congressional purpose, the Court wrote, while the new one was 
not. 
If a trial court acquits a defendant who has been placed in 
jeopardy, retrial is barred even if the acquittal was erroneous, and 
no casuistical procedural analysis can be invoked to avoid that 
result. In Sanabria u. United States, 141 the defendant was charged 
in a single-court indictment with having participated in an illegal 
gambling business;142 a section of state law was incorporated by 
reference to define the unlawful enterprise. At the close of the 
government's proof, the district court decided that the referenced 
state statute governed only horsebetting, not numbers, and on 
that basis alone erroneously ruled out evidence that the defen- 
dant had engaged in numbers t ran~act i0ns . l~~ The court then ac- 
136. Id. at 29 n.15. 
137. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
138. 435 U.S. 6 (1978). 
139. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1976). 
141. 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978). 
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976). 
143. Another section of the state code, mistakenly omitted from the indictment, 
clearly prohibited numbers rackets. That error was subject to correction under Rule 7 of 
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quitted Sanabria because the prosecution had failed to prove the 
horsebetting charge. The government appealed on the theory that 
the trial court disposition amounted to dismissal of an indictment 
which came within the prosecutorial appeals statute.ld4 The court 
of appeals interpreted the trial court action as a holding that 
discrete crimes had been charged in the same count, that they 
should be severed, and that one of the severed counts should be 
dismissed. Hence, the dismissal was not on the merits and prose- 
cution appeal was possible under Dinitz v. United States.ld5 The 
Supreme Court sharply disagreed with the circuit court analysis. 
The constitutional issue arising from prosecutorial appeals is 
not the question of appellate powers as such, said the Court, but 
rather whether retrial on the merits would be a possibility if the 
government were successful on appeal. If that possibility exists, 
then double jeopardy bars appeal. The trial court action in 
Sanabria was clearly an acquittal on a single charge, not a sever- 
ance and partial dismissal. The trial court had not found that the 
indictment failed to state an offense, as in Lee v. United States;146 
instead, it had held the allegations to be too narrow to admit 
certain evidence. Under the federal statute, properly interpreted, 
there was but one crime and it was independent of the number 
of potential state offenses committed at the same time. Indeed, 
it would have been improper to divide the charge into separate 
counts based on state law categories. Accordingly, the trial court 
had acquitted on the merits, barring retrial unless the case fell 
within two narrow exceptions: defense resistance to consolidation 
of separately charged offenses,ld7 or defense delay in raising a 
known legal defense until jeopardy attaches in order to forestall 
retrial.ld8 Sanabria, however, turned on an erroneous ruling on 
relevancy of evidence which the prosecution wished to overturn 
on appeal. That, the Court held, is exactly the type of prosecution 
appeal double jeopardy forbids. 
A similar policy underlay the Court's holding in Burks u. 
United States14g that a defendant cannot be retried if the sole 
basis for appellate reversal is insufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain a conviction. There, the court of appeals had remanded 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the evidence was admissible on other 
grounds. 98 S. Ct. at 2181 n.22. 
144. 18 U.S.C. 5 3731 (1976). 
145. 424 U.S. 600 (1976). 
146. 432 U.S. 23 (1977). 
147. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977). 
148. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 394 (1975). 
149. 98 S. Ct. 2141 (1978). 
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the case for the trial court to determine whether an acquittal 
should be entered or a new trial ordered. The Supreme Court 
ruled that no such option existed. If the district court had acquit- 
ted for insufficient evidence, clearly no retrial would have been 
possible. However, if a reversal turns even in part on trial error 
or other procedural flaw,lJO then another proceeding free from 
error is possible because reversal embodies no conclusion that the 
prosecution has failed to prove its case. "When this occurs," the 
Court reasoned "the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a 
fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society 
maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are pun- 
ished."151 When the sole basis of reversal is insufficiency of evi- 
dence, however, then the prosecution cannot be given "the pro- 
verbial 'second bite at the apple.'"lJ2 Thus, the court of appeals 
should have directed entry of a judgment of acquittal in the case. 
The Court also held, in Greene v. Massey, lJ3 that Burks is binding 
on the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
In Arizona v. WashingtonlJ4 the Court dealt definitively with 
the matter of retrial after mistrial, a problem that has surfaced 
periodically before it.lJ5 In opening remarks to the jury, Washing- 
ton's counsel mentioned alleged prosecution misconduct in an 
earlier trial. When the prosecutor requested a mistrial, defense 
counsel asked for additional time to find law supporting the pro- 
priety of his comments. To save time, two prosecution witnesses 
were called to testify. The next day, after defense counsel had 
produced no precedent supporting his position, the prosecution 
once more urged a mistrial. The trial court, after mentioning its 
concern that a mistrial would bar retrial, granted the mistrial 
based on defense counsel's comments. After the state appellate 
court rejected the defense's interlocutory appeal against the 
order, the defendant obtained federal habeas corpus to prevent 
retrial. The district court noted in issuing the writ that the state 
court judge had made no specific finding of manifest necessity in 
granting the mistrial. The federal court of appeals affirmed al- 
though, like the district court, it found defense counsel's state- 
150. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (defective indictment). 
151. 98 S.  Ct. at 2149. 
152. Id. at 2150. 
153. 98 S. Ct. 2151 (1978). 
154. 434 U.S. 497 (1978). 
155. See, e.g., United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976); United States v. Dinitz, 
424 U.S. 600 (1976); Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 
400 U.S. 470 (1971). 
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ments to have been legally improper. The Supreme Court re- 
versed. 
For the reasons canvassed later in Sanabria and Burks, the 
Court recognized that retrial is impossible a t  state instance after 
either conviction or acquittal. If a proceeding is stopped before 
final adjudication, however, the same rule does not necessarily 
apply. The "valued right to have the trial concluded by a particu- 
lar tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in 
affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present 
his evidence to an impartial jury."15s Although the heavy burden 
of showing manifest necessity rests on the prosecution to justify 
a mistrial, the standard demanded by the Court is not a mechan- 
ical one: "there are degrees of necessity and we require a 'high 
degree' before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate."15' 
The Court identified the easy cases. A mistrial to allow the 
prosecution to strengthen its evidence at  retrial is an "abhorrent" 
p r a ~ t i c e . ~ ~ ~ ' T h u s , "  wrote the Court, "the strictest scrutiny is 
appropriate when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability 
of critical prosecution evidence, or when there is reason to believe 
that the prosecutor is using the superior resources of the State to 
harass or to achieve a tactical advantage over the accused."159 At 
the other extreme is the hung jury, where a mistrial and retrial 
are appropriatelsO to accord "recognition to society's interest in 
giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those 
who have violated its laws."lsl 
On the spectrum of trial problems, the Court felt that Wash- 
ington's case fell within the area of justified mistrials. Defense 
counsel acted wrongly in pointing out prosecution misconduct in 
the earlier trial, because such evidence is not admissible under 
Arizona law. While some trial courts might have contented them- 
selves with cautionary instructions rather than mistrials, that did 
not mean that the trial judge acted improperly in the instant 
litigation. The Court itself in other settings had sustained a trial 
court conclusion that a fair trial could not be expected under the 
particular  circumstance^.^^^ An error in an opening statement can 
156. 434 U.S. at 505. 
157. Id. at 506. 
158. Id. at 507-08. 
159. Id. 
160. United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 (1976). 
161. 434 U.S. at 509. 
162. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (jury dismissed after 
start of trial when court discovered that one juror had served on the grand jury that 
indicted the defendant); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (jury dismissed 
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bias an entire jury panel; discipline or removal of erring counsel 
will not necessarily dispel such a taint, and cautionary instruc- 
tions are not necessarily effective. Thus, the Court reasoned, a 
trial court decision on such matters is entitled to great deference. 
In Washington, the necessary high degree of manifest necessity 
was present. "Neither party has a right to have his case decided 
by a jury which may be tainted by bias."163 
Finally, the Court ruled that the absence of a specific trial 
court finding on manifest necessity does not mean appellate or 
federal courts must conclude none existed. If the state court re- 
cord contains enough to justify such a ruling, "the failure to ex- 
plain that ruling more completely does not render it constitution- 
ally defective."la Specific findings may be helpful but are not 
constitutionally mandated. On the Washington record, the Court 
found sufficient support for the trial court order of mistrial. 
Washington principles also governed United States v. 
ScottlB5 later in the Term. In that case, the defendant attacked a 
federal controlled substances prosecution on the basis of prein- 
dictment delay. The trial court dismissed two counts after all the 
evidence had been received; the jury acquitted on the other. 
When the government sought to appeal the dismissal, the court 
of appeals rejected the appeal on the strength of United States 
v. Jenkins. ls6 The Supreme Court reversed. 
According to the Court, the key issue in determining whether 
prosecution appeal is compatible with double jeopardy restric- 
tions is whether a reevaluation of a case on the merits is possible. 
If a second trial would not entail such a reevaluation, a court 
must then inquire whether a defendant has been deprived un- 
fairly of his or her right to a judgment on the merits by the trier 
of fact first convened. When the defense moves for a mistrial, the 
Court reasoned, the argument in favor of retrial is that the motion 
embodies a considered decision to forgo the judgment of the jury 
already sworn to try the case. 
In reconsidering Jenkins, the Court opined that the operative 
principle ought to be that retrial is constitutionally permissible 
whenever "the defendant is responsible for the second prosecu- 
tion."lB7 In Scott, the defendant chose not to submit the issue of 
after possible acquaintance of one juror and the defendant came to light after trial had 
begun). 
163. 434 U.S. at 516. 
164. Id. at 517. 
165. 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1978). 
166. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). 
167. 98 S. Ct. at 2196. 
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guilt or innocence to the jury, but rather invoked a legal claim 
designed to forestall prosecution despite adequate government 
evidence to convict. Burks was obviously distinguishable because 
it turned on a judicial holding of insufficiency of prosecution 
proof; Sanabria was similarly distinguished. The grounds relied 
upon by the lower court in Scott, however, were independent of 
guilt or innocence. The Court said that in other contexts courts 
encounter "no difficulty in distinguishing between those rulings 
which relate to 'the ultimate question of guilt or innocence' and 
those which serve other purposes."lM Thus, "the dismissal of an 
indictment for preindictment delay represents a legal judgment 
that a defendant, although criminally culpable, may not be pun- 
ished because of a supposed constitutional violation."169 
In essence, the underlying theory allowing retrial in Scott is 
not waiver by the defendant, as it is in the Green context170 where 
the inquiry is into the scope of permissible retrial under an origi- 
nal indictment or information following reversal of a conviction 
on appeal. Rather when no determination on the merits has been 
sought or allowed, the Court believes the double jeopardy policy 
of preventing harassment does not apply to an appeal by the 
prosecution aimed at setting aside trial court action taken at 
defense instance. Such a defendant, in the Court's view, "has not 
been 'deprived' of his valued right to go to the first jury; only the 
public has been deprived of its valued right to 'one complete 
opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.' "171 
Consequently, Jenkins was overruled after an unusually brief 
lifespan. 
The last of the Court's 1978 double jeopardy decisions, 
Swisher u. Brady,lT2 dealt with juvenile delinquency adjudica- 
tions. The litigation arose concerning a Maryland rule (which 
underwent a process of modification in the course of the litiga- 
tion) that provided for an initial hearing before a master who 
submitted proposed findings to a juvenile court judge. The judge 
could not conduct de novo hearings without consent of both par- 
ties, but could accept, reject, or modify the master's proposed 
findings on both the fact of delinquency and disposition of an 
adjudicated respondent. A three-judge federal court concluded 
that this form of review by a juvenile court constituted double 
168. Id. at 2197 n.11. 
169. Id. at 2197. 
170. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
171. 98 S. Ct. at 2198 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)). 
172. 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978). 
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jeopardy and enjoined state officials from taking exception to 
masters' findings of nondelinquency or disposition. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
It was clear to the Court that hearings before a master place 
a juvenile respondent in jeopardy;173 but the controlling issue, 
under the rationale of Arizona v. Washington, was whether the 
state procedure allowed the prosecution an additional chance to 
bolster its case. The Court concluded that it did not. The state 
had but a single opportunity to make its presentation before a 
master, and could adduce no additional evidence before a juve- 
nile court unless the defense consented. 
The Swisher plaintiffs also contended that to place the same 
matter before both master and judge increased the risk that an 
innocent respondent might be adjudicated a delinquent. The 
majority, however, thought that only the judge was an adjudica- 
tor under Maryland law, so that there was but one adjudication, 
not a succession of adjudications. Nor did the Maryland proce- 
dure make possible a second trial, barred by Green, since the 
juvenile court reviews only documents without supplementary 
briefs or arguments and without the presence of the respondent 
or counsel. And, even if these procedural attributes were present, 
the Court reasoned that the result would be no different since this 
would be similar to briefing and arguments following bench trial, 
not to a second fullblown proceeding. Consequently, if a juvenile 
court judge pursuant to local rule makes supplementary findings 
sua sponte, in response to a state motion, or based on a defense 
exception to the record before the master (or that record as sup- 
plemented by evidence to which neither party objects), there is 
no double jeopardy violation. 
3. Right to Counsel 
The problem of representing multiple defendants is not eas- 
ily solved, but the Court tried. In Holloway v. Arkansas, 175 a pub- 
lic defender assigned to represent three defendants in a robbery 
and rape case indicated to the trial court, before trial, the proba- 
bility of a conflict of interest. The trial court refused to pursue 
the question then or later at trial when the possibility of conflict 
173. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court outlawed adult proceedings 
after a delinquency adjudication notwithstanding a subsequent finding that respondant 
was unfit for treatment as a juvenile. As far as attachment of jeopardy is concerned, the 
issue in Swisher was practically indistinguishable. 
174. See text accompanying notes 154-56 supra. 
175. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
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became even more real. Ultimately, counsel was limited to plat- 
ing each defendant on the witness stand to relate his own story 
in his own words. The ensuing conviction of all three was affirmed 
in a state appellate court because the record showed no substan- 
tial support for the defendants' claim of conflict of interest. The 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Glasser v. United State~~~Vecision is still the controlling 
law. To allow a single attorney to represent two or more clients 
does not in itself violate the sixth amendment, since proper repre- 
sentation is possible, and may even be advantageous in many 
instances. Defendants also can waive a constitutional objection. 
And, even if a conflict exists, two important procedural issues 
would normally face a court assessing a sixth amendment claim: 
What showing must be made to reverse a conviction if counsel 
failed to raise the possibility of conflict? And what is the extent 
and nature of a trial court's duty to inquire on its own into possi- 
ble conflicts? Holloway involved neither of these questions, how- 
ever, because counsel actually advanced the issue. "The judge 
then failed either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate 
steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote to warrant 
separate counsel. 
Counsel might have urged his requests for appointment of 
other counsel "more vigorously and in greater detail," but "the 
trial court's responses hardly encouraged pursuit of the separate- 
counsel claim; and as to presenting the basis for that claim in 
more detail, defense counsel was confronted with a risk of violat- 
ing, by more disclosure, his duty of confidentiality to his 
clients."178 An attorney representing multiple clients is usually in 
the best position to know whether there is a conflict; misstate- 
ments or other dilatory tactics would place an attorney in danger 
of sanctions by the court for misconduct. A trial court can explore 
the adequacy of the basis urged "without improperly requiring 
disclosure of the confidential communications of the client."179 
The trial court did not do that in Holloway. 
An additional issue was whether reversal was required in the 
absence of a showing of actual prejudice. The Court read Glasser 
"as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint 
representation over timely objection reversal is automatic."180 
176. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
177. 435 U.S. at 484. 
178. Id. at 485. 
179. Id. at 487. 
180. Id. at 488. 
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The right to counsel is basic, to the point that any infringement 
in a capital case means automatic reversal. That counsel was 
physically present during the proceeding does not justify a depar- 
ture from the general rule, since the refusal to appoint separate 
counsel may well have handicapped counsel in exploring possible 
plea agreements, including leniency in return for turning prosecu- 
tion evidence. "The mere physical presence of an attorney does 
not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate's 
conflicting obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial 
matters."lgl A contrary rule requiring a showing of specific preju- 
dice, the Court reasoned, "would not be susceptible of intelligent, 
evenhanded application."la Some trial records may reveal preju- 
dice, others may not. "Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless 
error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided specula- 
tion."lg3 Accordingly, reversal was required. Three dissenting Jus- 
tices, however, opposed the Court's per se reversal rule, and 
would have preferred a requirement that a conflict be shown to 
have "hampered a potentially effective defense."lg4 
4. Jury instructions 
The Court dealt with two rather troublesome standard jury 
instructions. One was an instruction on a defendant's right of 
silence delivered over defense objections. The other was an in- 
struction on the presumption of innocence. 
Lakeside v. Oregon1= continues unimpaired the Court's pre- 
cedent that adverse comment on a claim of privilege, whatever 
the source, impairs privilege, and that no pressure a t  all can be 
put on defendants to testify in their own behalf. The defense, 
however, was wrong in suggesting that an instruction on privilege 
can never be given over defense objection. Such a position rests 
on two doubtful propositions; first, that jurors will not have no- 
ticed the failure of a defendant to testify and thus will draw no 
adverse inference from that fact, and second, that the jury will 
disregard a specific judicial instruction. "Federal constitutional 
law cannot rest on speculative assumptions so dubious as 
these."lg6 Instructions of this sort are necessary, the Court said, 
to "flag the jurors' attention to concepts that must not be misun- 
181. Id. at 490. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 491. 
184. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
185. 435 US. 333 (1978). 
186. Id. at 340. 
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derstood, such as reasonable doubt and burden of proof."lS7 States 
can decree otherwise by local rule, but a neutral instruction given 
over defense objection does not infringe federal constitutional 
rights. 
The failure to accede to a defense objection also does not 
deny the sixth amendment-right to counsel. Counsel does not 
control otherwise legitimate decisions of a trial court. The right 
to counsel is important, "[blut that right has never been under- 
stood to confer upon defense counsel the power to veto the wholly 
permissible actions of the trial judge. It is the judge, not counsel, 
who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and 
lawful trial."ls8 Thus, the sixth amendment cannot "operate to 
prevent a court from instructing a jury in the basic constitutional 
principles that govern the administration of criminal justice."lm 
The Court long ago had held that the presumption of inno- 
cence is "axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at 
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."190 In 
Taylor v. Kentu~ky,'~' a trial court rejected a defense instruction 
on the presumption and gave no equivalent of its own; its only 
cognate instruction was on the prosecution burden to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor's conviction was sustained in 
the state appellate courts, but the Supreme Court reversed. 
Even though the presumption may not be conceptually sepa- 
rate from the prosecution's ultimate burden of persuasion, there 
has long been agreement that it should be the subject of an inde- 
pendent instruction of law to juries. Due process may not require 
use of the phrase "presumption of innocence" or of any particular 
formula, but, the Court said, it does dictate that nothing dilute 
"the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evi- 
dence and beyond a reasonable doubt."lN A presumption-of- 
innocence instruction "simply represents one means of protecting 
the accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on the basis 
of proof adduced at  trial."lg3 
On the facts of Taylor, the Court held that omission of an 
instruction on the presumption of innocence violated the defen- 
dant's due process rights. Trial court instructions in the case were 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 341-42. 
189. Id. at 342. 
190. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
191. 98 S. Ct. 1930 (1978). 
192. Id. at 1935 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)). 
193. Id. at 1935. 
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"rather Spartan,"lg4 and the prosecution's closing argument had 
tied the defendant to every other convicted defendant and had 
intimated that every accused person is guilty. Additionally, a t  
other points the prosecutor had invited the jury to consider ad- 
versely the defendant's procedural status and to draw adverse 
inferences from the fact of arrest and indictment. Although the 
prosecutor's statements were not necessarily reversible error 
standing alone, they created the need for careful countering in- 
structions, requested by the defense but not given. The Court 
reasoned that where trial was essentially a swearing-match be- 
tween defendant and complainant, there was real danger that a 
jury would convict on the basis of Taylor's status as defendant 
rather than the weight of legal evidence. 
The state argued that an instruction on burden of persuasion 
was sufficient to alleviate the problem. The Court, however, 
found that the trial court's instruction was no "model of clar- 
ity,"lg5 using a formula criticized as confusing, though not of itself 
constituting reversible error. Even if the instruction had been 
clearer, it could not replace an instruction on the presumption of 
innocence. Nor did oral argument on the matter, even if correct 
in content, substitute for an instruction: "It was the duty of the 
court to safeguard petitioner's rights, a duty only it could have 
performed reliably." lg6 
Taylor is offered by the majority as an ad hoc application of 
due process concepts to peculiar circumstances, and not as a 
general rule of constitutional procedure. In light of the Court's 
decision, however, there seems little reason to withhold a properly 
drawn instruction on the presumption of innocence requested by 
the defense, if for no other reason than to avoid latent federal 
constitutional problems. 
5. Jury deli berations 
A trial court must be extremely cautious about conversations 
with a jury foreperson out of the presence of counsel. During jury 
deliberations in United States u. United States Gypsum Co., ln an 
antitrust case, with the reluctant consent of counsel, the trial 
judge spoke privately with the jury foreperson to determine the 
physical condition of the jurors after five months of trial and 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 1936. 
196. Id. at 1937. 
197. 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978). 
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seven days of sequestered deliberation. In the process, the judge 
likely conveyed an expectation that the jury would reach a verdict 
one way or another, and the jury convicted the following day. 
This, the Supreme Court held, amounted to reversible error. 
In effect, the trial judge delivered a modified Allen chargelg8 
without affording counsel an opportunity to counter its impact. 
"Any ex parte meeting or communication between the judge and 
the foreman of a deliberating jury is pregnant with possibilities 
for error."lDg There is no way, the Court reasoned, to be sure of 
the direction such a conversation will take; unexpected questions 
can produce "unintended and misleading impressions of the 
judge's subjective personal views which have no place in his in- 
struction to the jury-all the more so when counsel are not pres- 
ent to challenge the  statement^."^^ Counsel were led to believe 
that only the condition of the jury would be discussed, whereas 
something else was mentioned, suggesting a possibly deadlocked 
jury in need of clarifying instructions given in the presence of 
counsel. The error, therefore, was not solely the ex parte discus- 
sion, as undesirable as that may have been, but also the ensuing 
consequences. There was a risk that innocent misstatements or 
misinterpretations of legal points occurred when the foreperson 
reported the conversations with the court to the entire panel, 
and there was no way to determine later what was said a t  that 
time. The foreperson could have understood the judge to be in- 
sisting on a verdict, which would have been reversible error if 
stated in an instruction. Hence, the Court concluded,' it 
amounted to reversal grounds in this setting as well. 
D. Sentencing and Punishment 
1. Pro bation conditions 
In Durst v. United States,"' the Court held that the payment 
of fines and restitution may properly be a condition of probation 
under the Federal Youth Corrections The decision turns on 
an interpretation of the special legislation in light of the general 
federal probation statute,203 but the analysis clearly accepts the 
198. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY § 5.4 and com- 
mentary at 149-56 (Approved Draft, 1968). 
199. 98 S. Ct. at 2885. 
200. Id. 
201. 434 U.S. 542 (1978). 
202. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976). 
203. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1976). 
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underlying constitutionality of such sanctions. Fines imposed as 
a condition of probation are not necessarily punitive rather than 
rehabilitative; they avoid "the harsh treatment of incarceration, 
while assuring that the offender accepts responsibility for his 
transgression. "204 
2. Capital punishment 
In two related cases,205 the Court (eight Justices sitting) in- 
validated Ohio's death penalty statute because it severely limited 
the mitigating factors used in determining whether to impose the 
ultimate sanction. The defendant in Lockett v. 0hio206 was con- 
victed as an accomplice to a felony murder based on armed rob- 
bery; there was evidence suggesting either that she did not know 
violence was to be used, or that she did not know a crime was 
contemplated. Ohio law allowed consideration of only three miti- 
gating factors: (1) inducement or facilitation of the crime by a 
victim; (2) duress, coercion, or strong provocation without which 
commission of the offense would have been unlikely; and (3) psy- 
chosis or mental deficiency of which the defendant's act was the 
primary product. Presentence information did not trigger any of 
these in Lockett's case, but other elements present might well 
have made a difference. 
The plurality opinion by the Chief Justice drew from the 
Court's principal 1976 decisionsm7 a holding by six Justices that 
statutes must allow for an unlimited range of mitigating circum- 
stances. Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment because, to 
him, the capital penalty under any circumstances violates the 
eighth amendment. Justice Blackmun was concerned about im- 
posing the death penalty without consideration of the defendant's 
mens rea and extent of involvement where vicarious liability prin- 
ciples are used." Mens rea was also the principal concern of 
Justice White, who preferred "a finding that the defendant en- 
gaged in conduct with the conscious purpose of producing 
death"209 before the capital penalty could be exacted. Only Jus-- 
tice Rehnquist would have sustained the statute because of his 
view that the fairness of the proceeding imposing a death penalty 
is the only issue of constitutional dimension. A similar division 
204. 434 U.S. at 554 (quoting the unpublished district court opinion). 
205. Bell v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978). 
206. 98 S. Ct. 2954 (1978). 
207. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
208. See MODEL PENAL CODE 9 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
209. 98 S. Ct. at 2985 (White, J., dissenting in part). 
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in analysis governs Bell v. Ohio,21o the other challenge to the Ohio 
statute last Term. 
One can but hope that a majority rationale will soon emerge 
to guide state legislatures, since there is much to support Justice 
White's belief that the plurality rationale so undercuts the proba- 
ble theoretical underpinnings of the 1976 decisions that the death 
penalty will be as erratically imposed, when defense counsel have 
unlimited freedom to submit possibly mitigating data, as it was 
before Furman v. Georgia. 211 
3. Sentencing in noncapital cases 
In sentencing decisions, federal trial courts may take account 
of perjury committed by defendants during trial. In United States 
v. Grayson212 the trial judge candidly admitted considering defen- 
dant's perjury, which he thought had been amply demonstrated 
at  trial; the court of appeals reversed for that reason. The Su- 
preme Court reversed again, agreeing with the majority position 
among federal courts of appeal that perjury is a legitimate factor 
bearing on the sentencing process. 
The Court surveyed penal theory and concluded that aggra- 
vating and mitigating factors bearing on an offense as such, and 
not exclusively on rehabilitation, may be taken account of in 
sentencing. Although presentence reports are important in pro- 
viding background information for sentencing courts, both the 
Court and Congress213 have confirmed that sentencing courts can 
consider information not in a presentence report. "A defendant's 
truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his own behalf, al- 
most without exception, has been deemed probative of his atti- 
tudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and hence 
relevant to sentencing."214 One circuit had indicated that defen- 
dants are under such pressure to lie on their own behalf that the 
fact should not be held against them, but the Court found this 
to be "a deterministic view of human conduct that is inconsistent 
with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system."215 
Grayson argued that to consider perjury in this way 
amounted to punishment without charge, trial, and conviction; 
but the reasons advanced in support of that argument were insuf- 
210. 98 S. Ct. 2977 (1978). 
211. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
'212. 98 S. Ct. 2610 (1978;. 
213. See 18 U.S.C. 5 3577 (1976). 
214. 98 S. Ct. at 2616. 
215. Id. at 2617. 
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ficient to displace what the Court and Congress had previously 
approved. Sentencing courts may consider all aspects of a defen- 
dant's character and life, as illustrated by Williams v. New 
Y ~ r l z , ~ ' ~  in which the sentencing court was permitted to consider 
burglaries for which the defendant had not been formally 
charged. Moreover, the Court reasoned, a contrary rule simply 
would produce a lack of candor in judicial statements about fac- 
tors used in support of sentence determinations, and thus would 
be unenforceable. 
The Court also rejected Grayson's premise that defendants 
will not take the stand if they fear their testimony ultimately will 
be used to justify a more severe sentence. The witness oath, the 
Court countered, is not a meaningless ritual, and "[tlhere is no 
protected right to commit perjury."217 Moreover, Grayson does 
not allow "a sentencing judge to enhance, in some wooden or 
reflex fashion, the sentences of all defendants whose testimony is 
deemed false."218 Instead, a trial court must evaluate whether a 
defendant's testimony indeed contained "willful and material 
falsehoods, and, if so, assess in light of all the other knowledge 
gained about the defendant the meaning of that conduct with 
respect to his prospects for rehabilitation and restoration to a 
useful place in 
4. Prisoner detainers 
The issue of whether, by issuing writs of habeas corpus ad 
prosequendum to bring state prisoners to federal court, federal 
judges trigger the time for trial required under the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers has troubled federal courts. The Court 
held in United States v. M a ~ r o ~ ~ O  that such a writ, standing alone, 
does not qualify as a detainer, but that if a true detainer has 
already been filed the writ constitutes a "written request for tem- 
porary custody" of the prisoner which requires commencement of 
federal trial within 120 days. 
The Court held that the United States is bound by the agree- 
ment as both a sending and a receiving jurisdiction, and not 
simply as a sending entity when states request custody of federal 
prisoners. But analysis of habeas corpus ad prosequendum shows 
that it does not resemble a detainer. A detainer indicates only 
216. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
217. 98 S. Ct. at 2618. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. 98 S .  Ct. 1834 (1978). 
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that a prisoner ultimately is wanted; it has the practical impact 
of interfering with participation in rehabilitation programs and 
delaying parole consideration. For these reasons the agreement 
stresses prompt disposition of charges through transfer for trial. 
A writ of habeas corpus, in contrast, requires swift compliance 
and produces none of the adverse consequences wrought by a 
detainer. Consequently, it is not a detainer within the agreement, 
and the trial court improperly dismissed the pending federal pros- 
ecution of Mauro when he was returned to state custody before 
federal trial. 
In a case heard concurrently with Mauro in which a detainer 
had been filed, however, a contrary result was indicated. There, 
a federal writ would alleviate none of the adverse impact of a 
previously filed detainer, so speedy disposition of the pending 
federal case was required. Any interpretation of the agreement 
permitting return of a prisoner without prompt trial as defined 
in the agreement "would allow the Government to gain the ad- 
vantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner without assum- 
ing the responsibilities that the Agreement intended to arise from 
such an action."221 A prisoner does not have to spell out the details 
of a failure to comply; an objection to delayed trial after receipt 
of a detainer is enough. 
5. Prison conditions 
The Court this past Term in effect approved federal court 
intervention in the operation of a state prison system if conditions 
are sufficiently oppressive. In Hutto v. Finney212 the state ap- 
pealed a lower federal court ruling that disciplinary segregation 
for more than thirty days under then-existing prison conditions 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court 
affirmed. The district court did not hold that such a limitation 
applies under all conditions, nor did the Supreme Court. Isolation 
for the duration of sentence might not be objectionable if "new 
conditions of confinement are not materially different from those 
affecting other  prisoner^."^^ Conversely, a "filthy, overcrowded 
cell and a diet of ' g r ~ e ' ~ ~ ~  might be tolerable for a few days and 
intolerably cruel for weeks or months."225 Length of confinement, 
221. United States v. Ford, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 1849 (1978). 
222. 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978) 
223. Id. at 2572. 
224. Grue is "a substance created by mashing meat, potatoes, oleo, syrup, vegetables, 
eggs, and seasoning into a paste and baking the mixture in a pan." Id. at 2570. 
225. Id. at 2572. 
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the Court wrote, is but one of many factors properly considered 
by a trial court in fashioning an order. The detailed order in 
Finney's case was appropriate, however, in light of the state's 
history of ignoring nonspecific federal mandates. 
The matter of media access to jails and prisons is discussed 
below. 226 
E. Remedies 
1.  Interlocutory appeal 
The Court has previously allowed interlocutory appeals in 
federal prosecutions, notably in instances of denial of bail reduc- 
tionzn and rejection of a claim of double jeopardy.228 In both situa- 
tions, trial would have produced the very evil the constitutional 
right a t  issue was designed to forestall. But in United States v. 
McDonald229 the Court refused to lengthen that list by adding 
claimed denials of the right to a speedy trial. 
McDonald, while in military service, was investigated in 
connection with the murders of his wife and children. Some 
months later, after no military charges had been filed, he was 
honorably discharged. Nevertheless, the investigation continued 
for another four years and nearly five years after the commission 
of the crimes a federal grand jury indicted McDonald. He moved 
to dismiss on combined grounds of double jeopardy and delayed 
institution of proceedings which violated his due process rights 
under United States b. Marion. 230 The district court rejected the 
claim on the merits but the court of appeals reversed. The Su- 
preme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain an interlocutory appeal. 
In contrast to the earlier contexts in which interlocutory ap- 
peal had been allowed the Court reasoned that whether delay has 
in fact prejudiced a defendant cannot be determined until after 
trial under the constitutional balancing test of Barker v. Wingo. 
Although dismissal of prosecution is the only sanction which can 
be invoked under the sixth amendment,232 this does not mean that 
an interlocutory appeal must be granted. 
Moreover, the Court wrote, to allow such appeals itself im- 
226. See text accompanying notes 278-86 infra. 
227. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). 
228. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). 
229. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). 
230. 404 U.S. 307 (1971); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). 
231. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
232. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973). 
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perils the objectives of the sixth amendment since (even though 
a defendant might wish to delay trial through appeal) the prose- 
cution may be unable to prove its case later, costs increase 
through maintaining defendants in pretrial detention, and provi- 
sionally released defendants can commit other crimes. Finally, no 
showing is required of a defendant when submitting a claim of 
delayed proceedings, as there is in the case of a claim of double 
jeopardy; accordingly, any defendant could advance such a claim 
and tie up proceedings for a considerable time by taking an ap- 
peal against denial of the motion. Thus, the Court held, no fed- 
eral appellate court can entertain an interim appeal based on a 
trial court determination of a speedy trial objection. State courts 
naturally are free to shape their own jurisprudence on the matter 
as they desire. 
2. Federal ha beas corpus233 
In deciding whether a state prisoner has exhausted state rem- 
edies, a federal district court cannot rely on the failure of a state 
appeIlate court to refer to the matter in its opinion.234 If the pris- 
oner has indeed advanced in the state proceeding the federal 
constitutional grounds renewed in the federal habeas corpus pro- 
ceeding and the state has answered, the exhaustion of remedies 
requirementn5 has been complied with whether or not the state 
appeals court elects to treat the legal issue in its opinion. 
Federal habeas corpus is purely civil in character, and is 
governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In 
Brow der u. Director, Illinois Department of fed- 
eral district court granted habeas corpus to a state prisoner, but 
the state waited twenty-eight days to request a stay of the order 
on the ground the court should not have entered it. A stay was 
allowed and the trial court confirmed its order as proper. The 
state then appealed and received a favorable judgment despite 
the habeas corp,us petitioner's contention that there was no ap- 
pellate jurisdiction under the federal rules. Specifically, Browder 
urged that the state's notice of appeal was not filed within thirty 
days after entry of judgment as required in civil cases,237 and that 
the period was not tolled during the ensuing proceedings because 
233. The function of habeas corpus ad prosequendum under the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers has been discussed in text accompanying notes 220-21 supra. 
234. Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332 (1978). 
235. Embodied in 28 U.S.C. 5 2254(b) (1976). 
236. 434 U.S. 257 (1978). 
237. 28 U.S.C. 6 2107 (1976); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). 
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the state's motion for rehearing was not submitted within ten 
days of the habeas corpus order.238 The state argued that the 
details of federal civil rules practice do not govern habeas corpus, 
but rather federal habeas corpus legislation, which contains no 
time limitations, alone controls. The Supreme Court confirmed 
Browder's position as the correct one. 
The thirty-day period under the federal appellate rules is, 
the Court wrote, "mandatory and jurisdi~tional."~~ Therefore, 
the notice of appeal was untimely unless a state motion for a stay 
was submitted promptly enough to toll the appeal period. The 
habeas corpus order was a final one, however, and its finality was 
not affected by the fact that its enforcement remained to be ac- 
complished. Even assuming the district court erred in issuing the 
writ, error is not the same as nonfinality; thus, any motion sub- 
mitted under the civil rules should have been lodged within ten 
days. Since the federal habeas corpus statute is silent on matters 
of procedure, writ practice, being civil in nature, is governed by 
regular civil rules unless their invocation impedes rather than 
promotes the purposes of the extraordinary writ. Because speed 
of habeas corpus is vital, as is finality, the civil rules periods 
support rather than defeat the objectives of the statutory remedy. 
Accordingly, the Court held, because the state did not meet the 
jurisdictional and mandatory time limits, the appeal should have 
been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. 
3. Section 1983240 federal civil rights proceedings 
During the 1976-1977 Term, the Court's decisions served to 
constrict the availability of relief under the original Federal Civil 
Rights Last Term its decisions were somewhat a mixed 
bag, although in certain aspects the scope of relief was aug- 
mented. 
It is most difficult to bring a state judicial officer within the 
scope of the federal legislation, as Stump v. S ~ a r k m a n ~ ~ ~  demon-
strates. There, a mother had petitioned a judge of a general juris- 
diction court to authorize the tuba1 ligation of a "somewhat re- 
238. The state had not been specific whether it relied on FED. R. CIV. P. 52(b) (motion 
to amend or enter additional findings), 59(a), (b) (motion for new trial), or 59(e) (motion 
to alter or amend judgment). 
239. 434 U.S. at 264. 
240. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1976). 
241. See George, Criminal Law: Foreword-Doctrinal Doldrums: The Supreme Court 
1976 Term Criminal Law Decisions, 68 J .  CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469, 485-86 (1977). 
242. 435 U S .  349 (1978). 
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tarded" daughter who, she claimed, was sexually delinquent. She 
had also stipulated to hold harmless the doctor and hospital in- 
volved in the operation. The judge, acting in his official capacity, 
subsequently approved the petition and signed the order without 
conducting a hearing. The daughter was told she was to have her 
appendix removed. When two years later she married and failed 
to conceive she discovered she had been sterilized and sued the 
judge and other officials involved under the federal statute. The 
trial court dismissed the complaint because the judge was im- 
mune to claims of federal liability and the acts of all other defen- 
dants were derivative from his action. The court of appeals re- 
versed on the basis that the trial judge had exceeded his jurisdic- 
tion in entering the order and had forfeited immunity because of 
his failure to accord the present plaintiff procedural due process. 
The Supreme Court reversed. 
The leading judicial immunity case243 is still controlling in its 
grant of immunity to judges unless there is a "clear absence of 
all jurisdi~tion."~~~ The Court held there was not that clear lack 
under state law in Sparkman; nothing specifically prohibited the 
exercise of the powers invoked by Judge Stump. Moveover, a 
failure to follow procedural requirements, even at  the due process 
level, does not eliminate judicial immunity. Only if a judge dis- 
charges a nonjudicial function can immunity be lost. A function 
is judicial if "it is a function normally performed by a judge" and 
the parties "dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."245 That 
was clearly so in Sparkman. Informality of procedure, including 
a want of docket number and the like, does not render a matter 
nonjudicial within such a definition. Nor does tragedy of conse- 
quences produce that result, because the purpose of the immun- 
ity doctrine is to safeguard the ability of judges to function free 
from the threat of litigation. Thus, the Court reasoned, the trial 
court disposition of the matter was correct. 
In Procunier v. N a ~ a r e t t e , ~ ~ ~  however, the Court confirmed 
its position that officials other than judges are protected by only 
a qualified immunity: immunity does not lie if an official knew 
or reasonably should have known that an activity would violate 
the constitutional right at issue, or if an official acted with a 
243. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872). 
244. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). A like immunity protects administrative adjudicators. Butz v. 
Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978). 
245. 435 U.S. at 362. 
246. 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 
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"malicious intention" to bring about a deprivation of known con- 
stitutional rights or other injury. Navarette involved prison ad- 
ministrators as federal defendants, but the scope of immunity 
had already been established in instances of a state governor,247 
school officials,24R a mental hospital ~ u p e r i n t e n d e n t , ~ ~ ~  and po- 
lice.2m On the facts of Navarette, there was no clear establishment 
of the claimed constitutional right a t  the time the litigation 
began, the right having been established by the Supreme Court 
in litigation subsequent to the initiation of the law~uit .~" Conse- 
quently, there was no intentional or negligent violation of consti- 
tutional rights since defendants "could not reasonably have been 
expected to be aware of a constitutional right that had not yet 
been declared. "252 
Monell v. New York City Department of Social ServicesZJ3 
overruled the Court's earlier holding that municipalities are to- 
tally immune from Civil Rights Act suits,2s4 holding that such 
governmental units are liable for "action pursuant to official 
municipal policy of some nature [that] caused a constitutional 
tort."2ss They cannot, however, be held liable under a respondeat 
superior theory simply because they employ tortfeasors; such a 
broad extension, in the Court's view, would bring about results 
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act indicates Congress 
intended to avoid. "Instead, it is when execution of a govern- 
ment's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by 
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official 
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is 
responsible . . . . "256 
In Alabama v. P ~ g h , ~ "  however, the Court held that the 
eleventh amendment prevents suit against a state government or 
one of its state-level departments unless the state consents. The 
Alabama State Constitution forbade such a consent, and there- 
247. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
248. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
249. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
250. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
251. The violation alleged in Navarette was improper interference with prisoners' 
outgoing correspondence which occurred before the Supreme Court had established a 
constitutional right to be free from such interference in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396 (1974). 
252. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 565. 
253. 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). 
254. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
255. 98 S. Ct. at 2036. 
256. Id. at 2038. 
257. 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978). 
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fore the case was remanded with orders to dismiss the state and 
its department of corrections from the proceedings. The doctrine 
has the nature of a jurisdictional bar which need not be asserted 
in a trial 
Carey u. Piphus2" teaches that a Federal Civil Rights Act 
plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by the denial of proce- 
dural due process or recover only the nominal sum of one dollar. 
The purpose of section 1983 is "to compensate persons for injuries 
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights."260 If a consti- 
tutional right parallels a tort claim the same damage rules gov- 
ern, but otherwise a plaintiff must establish a measure for dam- 
ages. In Piphus, students who had been suspended from school 
without administrative due process would have to prove actual 
emotional distress and its effect on them before compensatory 
damages could be awarded. Absent such proof only nominal dam- 
ages were available; punitive damages were not merited since the 
lower court specifically found a lack of malicious intent on the 
part of the school board. The Court left open the question of 
whether punitive damages might be awarded to deter intentional 
deprivations of rights, since none was alleged in P i p h ~ s . ~ ~ '  
Within limits, whether a Civil Rights Act proceeding sur- 
vives the death of a plaintiff is determined by the law of the state 
in which the action complained of occurred. In Robertson v. 
Wegrnann262 the plaintiff died without leaving an heir qualified 
under Louisiana law to continue the action. His executor sought 
to pursue the federal action on the ground that federal common 
law governed the survival of actions; the lower federal courts 
agreed but the Supreme Court reversed. 
The Civil Rights Act itself recognizes that if statutory lan- 
guage does not cover a matter, federal courts turn to "the com- 
mon law, as modified and changed by the constitution and stat- 
utes of the [forum] State,"263 if not inconsistent with the Consti- 
tution and laws of the United States. Federal law generally does 
not cover survival of actions, although state law does. Nothing in 
the Louisiana survivorship statutes in any way conflicted with 
the achievement of the basic purposes of section 1983. Since 
spouses, children, parents, and siblings could continue an action, 
258. Id. at 3058 n.1. 
259. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
260. Id. at 254. 
261. Id. at 257 n.11. 
262. 98 S. Ct. 1991 (1978). 
263. 42 U.S.C. 4 1988 (1976). 
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denying a decedent's estate the right to do so was not unreasona- 
ble. Nothing in the federal law appears to require compensation 
of an estate as such, and the possibility of abatement of a federal 
civil rights action is unlikely to affect the conduct of state officials 
aware that  unconstitutional conduct invites federal suit. The 
Court considered only the validity of Louisiana law; it did not 
resolve the issue presented by a state system allowing survival 
only for sharply limited classes of actions or recognizing no sur- 
vival a t  all. The Court also reserved comment on the situation in 
which death itself resulted from a deprivation of federal civil 
rights. The fact that abatement can occur, however, is not a 
sufficient ground to find inconsistency with federal law. The three 
dissenters, in contrast, agreed with the lower courts and sug- 
gested the need for remedial federal legislation. 
Hutto v. Finney2" dealt significantly with recovery of counsel 
fees in civil rights actions. The Court had held in 1975 that, as a 
general rule, counsel fees could not be awarded under then- 
existing legislation, with the possible exception of cases involving 
bad faith on the part of defendants.265 In Finney state officials 
objected to the award of $20,000 in counsel fees but the Court 
sustained the award. The Court felt that bad faith on the part of 
state officials was evident throughout the litigation, and the dis- 
trict court clearly intended the fee award to be a sanction not 
unlike a remedial fine for civil contempt. That being so, the indi- 
cation that the state department of corrections was to pay the fee 
did not render the order invalid, even though the order probably 
should not have contained that language.266 
The state also objected to a further award by the court of 
appeals of $2,500 to cover the costs and expenses of appeal, argu- 
ing that such awards would violate the eleventh amendment un- 
less the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Award Act of 1975267 was 
specifically applicable to states as defendants. The Court disa- 
greed. Inclusion of attorney's fees within costs is a matter of sub- 
stantial history, so that "[ilt is much too late to single out attor- 
ney's fees as the one kind of litigation cost whose recovery may 
not be authorized by Congress without an express statutory 
waiver of the States' imm~nity."~" The legislative purpose to 
264. 98 S.  Ct. 2565 (1978) (also discussed in text accompanying notes 222-25 supra) 
265. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (19%). 
266. See Alabama v. Pugh, 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying 
notes 257-58 supra). 
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (enacted to overcome Alyeska Pipeline). 
268. 98 S. Ct. at 2577-78. 
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allow this form of costs against defendants was clear. 
The fact that neither the state nor the department of correc- 
tions was expressly named as a defendant was also undetermina- 
tive. An action for injunctive relief against named prison officials 
was in effect an action against the state itself and was treated by 
the latter as such, since the state attorney general defended the 
original action and lodged the appeal. The state attorney general 
could not argue that the individual defendants should bear the 
liability personally and then look to the state for whatever relief 
they could obtain. Finally, the Court reasoned, the named liti- 
gants were not responsible for the bad faith litigation in the fed- 
eral court of appeals and thus the state should bear directly the 
burden of the award. 
F. T h e  Police 
The Court rendered two decisions that impact on law en- 
forcement officers as such, but not in the context of criminal 
procedural responsibilities. In Commissioner v. K o w a l ~ k i ~ ~ ~  state 
police objected to inclusion by the IRS of meal allowances given 
to troopers as taxable income. The state police had abandoned 
the system of having troopers report to meal stations because it 
took them from patrol for too long a time. Therefore, the state 
legislature provided an annual meal allowance increased accord- 
ing to rank; troopers could eat anywhere they chose, including 
their homes if nearby, or carry their own meals with them on 
patrol. The Tax Court ruled that the meal allowance was income 
and not within the concept of meals furnished for an employer's 
c o n v e n i e n ~ e . ~ ~  The Third Circuit reversed on the basis of an ear- 
lier decision that meal allowances were not taxable income. The 
Supreme Court agreed with the Tax Court's position. 
Unless payments fall within a specific statutory exemption 
they must be viewed as income under the broad statutory defini- 
tion of that term. The Court wrote that preenactment materials 
indicate clearly that the exemption of meals furnished for the 
convenience of the employer was not intended to cover cash pay- 
ments of any kind, and Congress has never excluded from in- 
come cash allowances of any sort. The specific exemption in the 
Internal Revenue Code for military subsistence allowances cre- 
269. 434 U.S. 77 (1977). 
270. While I.R.C. 8 119 provides that meals furnished for the convenience of the 
employer are exempt from taxation, the Tax Court held the patrolman's meal allowance 
to be income under the general rule of I.R.C. § 61(a). 
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ates no inequity to be removed through judicial construction of 
the statute. Congress had already rejected the state troopers' 
premise by repealing an earlier provision271 that had allowed 
troopers to exclude subsistence allowances of up to five dollars per 
day. This was intended to take from them an advantage other 
taxpayers did not enjoy. The dissenters disagreed with the major- 
ity interpretation, noting that "state troopers the country over, 
not handsomely paid to begin with, will never understand today's 
decision."272 In September 1978 Congress was considering over- 
turning Kowalski by statutory amendment.273 
In Foley v. C ~ n n e l i e ~ ~ ~  the Court ruled that states may consis- 
tently with equal protection exclude aliens from consideration for 
police employment. "The essence of our holdings to date is that 
although we extend to aliens the right to education and public 
welfare, along with the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in 
licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citizens."275 
Police have substantial discretion to regulate citizen conduct, 
arrest, detain, search, and seize; this "calls for a very high degree 
of judgment and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can 
have serious impact on individuals."276 "In short, it would be as 
anomalous to conclude that citizens may be subjected to the 
broad discretionary powers of noncitizen police officers as i t  
would be to say that judicial officers and jurors with power to 
judge citizens can be aliens."277 Thus, in this instance citizenship 
bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the partic- 
ular employment, and therefore the classification does not violate 
the dictates of equal protection. 
A. First Amendment Concerns 
Attention has been given above to the first amendment im- 
plications of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,27R which has generated a 
wave of protest on the part of the communications industry. By 
271. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 120, 68A Stat. 39 (repealed 1958). 
272. 434 U.S. at 98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
273. See H.R. 13205, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). In Massachusetts v. United States, 
435 U.S. 444 (1978), the Court refused to exempt state-owned police aircraft from the 
registration fee imposed on all private and civil governmental aircraft. User fees do not 
violate an implied immunity of state government against federal taxation. 
274. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
275. Id. at 297. 
276. Id. at 298. 
277. Id. at 299. 
278. 98 S .  Ct. 1970 (1978) (discussed in text accompanying notes 38-42 supra). 
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midyear 1978 several bills had been introduced in Congress to 
repudiate the holding, at  least as far as premises owned by media 
corporations are concerned.279 But, although Zurcher captured 
headlines, other decisions last Term also significantly delineated 
the interrelationships between the justice system and the media 
under the first amendment. 
In Houchins v. KQED, Inc2" the Court dealt with the issue 
of press and public access to possibly substandard jail facili- 
ties-a question left undetermined by the Court's 1974 decisions 
denying a claimed right by reporters to interview prisoners of 
their KQED is difficult to analyze in terms of rationale 
and future impact, because two Justices did not sit, and the 
remaining members of the Court divided three-one-three. 
The litigation arose when the radio station, joined by civil 
rights groups, sought access to parts of a local detention facility 
in which rapes and suicides reportedly had occurred. The defen- 
dant sheriff responded by instituting monthly tours by not more 
than twenty-five citizens. The tours involved neither interviews 
with nor observations of prisoners and apparently did not extend 
to the areas where the incidents allegedly had occurred. KQED 
and other media representatives went on the initial tour, but 
insisted on greater rights of access. A federal district court prelim- 
inarily enjoined the sheriff from denying news personnel access to 
all parts of the facility a t  reasonable times and hours and from 
preventing use of photographic and sound equipment to record 
conditions; it found no invasion of resident privacy in such an 
order. The court of appeals affirmed. 
Four Justices voted to vacate the order as too broad. Chief 
Justice Burger's plurality opinion concluded that, absent a legis- 
lative determination to the contrary, "the media has no right, 
special [sic] of access to [a detention facility] different from or 
greater than that accorded the public generally?" To this group 
of Justices, the press is "not a substitute for or an adjunct of 
government,"283 and is ill equipped, like the courts, to cope with 
problems of prison administration. Every jurisdiction has some 
public body with authority to inquire into prison and jail condi- 
279. See, e.g., H.R. 12952, H.R. 13145, H.R. 13169, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). One 
may assume that such legislation, if enacted, would affect only federal proceedings. 
280. 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978). 
281. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pel1 v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817 (1974). 
282. 98 S. Ct. a t  2597. 
283. Id. a t  2594. 
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tions and publish reports which become available to press and 
public. Moreover, in the Chief Justice's view, there is nothing to 
indicate that press investigations are more likely to uncover pub- 
lic malfeasance than official bodies; if anything, the latter are 
under more public pressure to report improper conditions than 
are private institutions like the media. 
Thus, the media are relegated by the plurality to the same 
sources of information as members of the public. Officials cannot 
prevent correspondence with prisoners, conversations with legal 
representatives of inmates, and interviews with former inmates, 
visitors, and officials of many kinds. Otherwise, the first amend- 
ment mandates no right of access to government information or 
sources of information within public control. 
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, but seems closer 
in philosophy to the three Justices who wished to affirm the lower 
court action. Thus, his rationale may be closest to a position 
which four of the seven sitting Justices might accept. He agreed 
with the Burger premise that 
[tlhe First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the 
public a right of access to information generated or controlled 
by government, nor do they guarantee the press any basic right 
of access superior to that of the public generally. The Constitu- 
tion does no more than assure the public and the press equal 
access once government has opened its doors.2R4 
To Justice Stewart, however, "equal access" requires differentia- 
tion between the media and the public, particularly, more ample 
access to facilities than participation in a brief monthly tour 
would afford. Therefore, the portion of the district court order 
requiring the sheriff to provide media access a t  reasonable hours 
and times was "both sanctioned by the Constitution and amply 
supported by the record."2R5 But the order was too broad in allow- 
ing media access to portions of the jail not open to the public and 
permitting random interviews initiated by reporters. After rever- 
sal, Justice Stewart would have left it open to the trial court to 
"accommodate equitably the constitutional role of the press and 
the institutional requirements of the jail."286 
The three dissenting Justices would have sustained the dis- 
position below because it would have eliminated the broad re- 
straint on access to information about jail operations that both 
284. Id. a t  2598 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
285. Id. a t  2599. 
286. Id. 
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public and press ought to have had. In the dissent's view, media 
access would have ended the obvious policy of concealment the 
sheriff was invoking and would have opened to public view an 
aspect of governmental operations affecting the liberty of both 
convicts and preconviction detainees presumed to be innocent. 
Whether a majority of the full Court, including Justices Black- 
mun and Marshall, considering a similar factual situation would 
rest with Chief Justice Burger or Justice Stevens is a matter of 
speculation, as is the true holding of KQED. Meanwhile, prison 
authorities are under no particular inducement to facilitate inves- 
tigative reporting on conditions within their institutions, al- 
though many state systems are much more open now to media 
access than was true a decade ago. 
According to Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 287 even 
evidence forming a part of court records is not available to either 
the public or the press under all circumstances. There, a private 
corporation sought, for broadcast and commercial sale, copies of 
tapes introduced in evidence a t  the Watergate trials. During the 
Watergate trials themselves, Judge Gesell had ruled that, while 
a common law privilege of access to judicial records applied, there 
could be no copying until criminal trials had been completed and 
procedures to avoid overcommercialization submitted for judicial 
approval. After criminal proceedings were completed the subsidi- 
ary litigation reverted to Judge Sirica, who refused to grant im- 
mediate access because the convicted Watergate defendants 
might be prejudiced during appeal. He also thought the Presiden- 
tial Recordings and Materials Preservation Act288 forestalled a 
need for immediate release because of the administrative proce- 
dures it embodied. The court of appeals reversed because it found 
the mere possibility of prejudice to the rights of the Watergate 
defendants in the event of retrial insufficient to outweigh the 
common law privilege of access. The Supreme Court reversed in 
turn. 
The Court recognized a "general right to inspect and copy 
public records and documents, including judicial records and 
 document^."^^ The right does not turn on a proprietary interest 
in the documents or a need to use them in litigation, but can 
reflect a watchdog function. But, the Court reasoned, such a 
claim is not absolute, and any court can control access to records 
sought for an improper purpose such as promotion of public or 
287. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). 
288. 44 U.S.C. 4 4  2107 note, 3315-3324 (Supp. V 1975)). 
289. 435 U.S. at 597-99. 
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private scandal, dissemination of libelous statements, and release 
of business information of value to competitors. 
The ex-President asserted a proprietary interest in the mate- 
rial and an infringement of privacy if the records were released. 
He also argued the confidentiality of the records based on the 
Court's 1974 Ninon decision on the Watergate tapes,290 as well as 
the impropriety, granted the marginal addition to public knowl- 
edge which marketing would accomplish, of commercializing the 
tapes through private release. The Court, however, refused to 
engage in any balancing of interests because the Presidential Re- 
cordings Act, already sustained as valid,2u had set forth an ad- 
ministrative procedure to determine release of such materials. 
The existence of this alternative mode of release resolved the 
litigation in the Warner Communications setting. 
Warner Communications also urged that the first amend- 
ment required release. But the Court held only that there is a 
"right of the press to publish accurately information contained in 
court records open to the public,"B2 a premise also prominent in 
the plurality opinion in KQED. Warner Communications did not 
involve that form of public record, but rather copies of tapes to 
which the public had never been given direct access. The first 
amendment "generally grants the press no right to information 
about a trial superior to that of the general public."293 
Nor, in the Court's view, did the right to a public trial gov- 
ern. There is no right to have trial proceedings recorded and 
broadcast, and the sixth amendment confers no special rights on 
the press. Public trial rights are satisfied if members of the public 
and press alike are given an opportunity to attend trials and 
report what they observe. 
Once a communications enterprise gains access to informa- 
tion about governmental operations, however, it cannot be pun- 
ished for disseminating it. So held the Court in Landmark Com- 
munications, Inc. v. Virginia.294 Virginia law made it a misde- 
meanor to divulge information about proceedings before a state 
judicial review commission inquiring into judicial misconduct. 
The defendant newspaper discovered the nature of an inquiry, 
including the name of a judge under investigation, and published 
- pp - -- - 
290. United States v. Nixon, 418 U S .  683 (1974). 
291. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U S .  425 (1977). 
292. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U S .  at 609 (citing Cox Broadcast- 
ing Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U S .  469 (1975)). 
293. Id. 
294. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
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the information accurately. It was found guilty despite a claim of 
first amendment protection. The state supreme court affirmed. 
The state court reasoned that since punishment had occurred 
after publication rather than before there had been no prior re- 
straint. The proper standard was. the clear and present danger 
test, which the state court found to have been satisfied because 
of the policies of protecting a judge's reputation during initial 
investigation, maintaining public confidence in the state's judi- 
cial system, and safeguarding complainants and witnesses 
against recrimination. Furthermore, the state court reasoned that 
the enactment of the statute amounted to a legislative declara- 
tion that divulgence of commission proceedings constituted a 
clear and present danger to the administration of justice. The 
Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court recognized that reliance on judicial tenure and 
disciplinary commissions is almost universal among the states. 
Confidentiality is important to commission effectiveness, in that 
it encourages complaint filing and protects judges and the judici- 
ary as an institution from publication of charges that may prove 
unfounded. Confidentiality also facilitates the work of a judicial 
commission by encouraging retirement or resignation of respon- 
dent judges without a formal hearing, and by enabling minor 
matters to be corrected without formal proceedings. However, 
only Virginia and Hawaii among the forty-nine jurisdictions with 
such a procedure impose criminal penalties for disclosure of infor- 
mation obtained by a judicial commission. 
Landmark Communications did not present the issue of 
criminality of someone who obtains information unlawfully and 
then publishes it. It also involved no claim of a media right of 
accessa5 or of prior restraint. The newspaper, however, argued 
that truthful reporting about public officials in connection with 
official duties is always insulated from criminal sanctions. The 
Court did not find it necessary to endorse that sweeping general 
contention, but did find the paper's interest in publication so 
close to the "core of the First Amendment"296 that nothing the 
state advanced as a protected interest outweighed it. 
The first amendment was intended to protect free discussion 
of public affairs; judges and courts are not exempt from such 
scrutiny. There was, therefore, a legitimate public interest in the 
295. Any claim to a media right of access was effectively foreclosed later in the Term 
in Warner Communications and KQED, discussed at notes 280-93 supra. 
296. 435 U.S. at 838. 
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proceedings of the state judicial inquiry commission. The state 
advanced nothing to justify the use of criminal penalties under 
such circumstances, particularly in light of the fact that so many 
other jurisdictions have found it unnecessary to do so. Accord- 
ingly, the need to preserve the confidentiality of an inquiry sys- 
tem cannot legitimate infliction of criminal punishment after the 
fact of publication. 
The Court also questioned whether the clear and present 
danger test applied in such a context; certainly, it had no me- 
chanical application. A legislative declaration that a clear and 
present danger exists does not resolve the matter.2Q7 The state 
court should have gone behind the legislative statement; had i t  
done so, the Court stated, it would have found nothing which 
could constitute Landmark Communications' publication a clear 
and present danger. 
In short, in the Court's thinking, investigative reporting re- 
mains an element of free enterprise. Official barriers cannot be 
imposed against investigating in the general community, as 
KQED indicates. Lawbreaking media representatives are no 
more insulated from sanctions than other members of the public, 
or so Landmark Communications appears to intimate. However, 
if the public has access to something, so does the press. Media 
representatives cannot claim the affirmative support of govern- 
ment to acquire information unavailable to the public generally, 
and, as Zurcher holds, neither can they resist lawful judicial pro- 
cess for designated evidence. Thus, government and media organ- 
izations are not peers and are not to be made so through invoca- 
tion of the first amendment. In short, the Term's decisions con- 
firm Chief Justice Burger's notation that the media indeed "are 
not a substitute for or an adjunct of government."298 Whether they 
should be is a matter open to debate. 
297. Chief Justice Burger wrote: 
A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the reasons impelling 
legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether the 
specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether 
the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Were it otherwise, the scope 
of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative definition 
and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power would 
be nullified. 
Id. at 844. 
298. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. at 2594. 
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B. Federal 0 bscenity Legislation 
The Court's earlier efforts to redefine constitutional limits on 
regulation of obscenity have not appreciably reduced the scope of 
litigation, as a perusal of federal and state appellate decisions 
reveals.29g The Court dealt only with minor aspects of the problem 
this past Term in the case of Pinkus u. United States.30o 
Pinkus had been convicted of violating the primary federal 
statute prohibiting transmission of obscene matter through the 
mails,301 on facts arising before the Court's key 1973 decisions.302 
I t  was stipulated that the defendant knowingly sent the material 
a t  issue to adults within California and elsewhere. Because the 
Roth-MemoirsJo3 test governed a t  the time, the defense placed 
considerable reliance on expert testimony demonstrating that the 
materials did not appeal to prurient interest, conflict with com- 
munity standards, or lack redeeming social value. The prosecu- 
tion offered contrary expert data. Pinkus was convicted and the 
court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. 
Pinkus' first objection was to the inclusion of "children" 
within the definition of "community standards" given by the trial 
court.304 The court of appeals thought it would have been better 
to omit reference to children but did not reverse in the absence 
of Supreme Court authority on point. The Court noted that the 
matter might well have been ruled harmless in Pinkus' case, but 
recognized the legitimacy of the need to have Court clarification 
of the question. "[Wle elect to take this occasion to make clear 
tha t  children are not to be included . . . as part of the 
'community' as that term relates to the 'obscene materials' pro- 
scribed by [the statute]."305 In the absence of proof that children 
were the intended recipients of the material in Pinkus, or reason 
299. See generally George, Obscenity Litigation: An Overview of Current Legal 
Controversies, 3 NAT'L J .  CRIM. DEF. 189 (1977). 
300. 98 S. Ct. 1808 (1978). There is a cognate decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 
98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978), which conforms the power of the FCC to invoke administrative 
sanctions for broadcasting indecent words to federal criminal coverage in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 
(1976). 
301. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976). 
302. Principally, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
303. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476 (1957). 
304. The jury instruction read, "In determining community standards, you are to 
consider the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the reli- 
gious and the irreligious, men, women and children, from all walks of life." Pinkus v. 
United States, 98 S. Ct. a t  1811 (emphasis in the original). 
305. Id. a t  1812. This holding had been signaled by the Court's decision in Butler v. 
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), which disallowed the protection of minors as the sole basis 
for prohibiting the dissemination of allegedly obscene materials to adults. 
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on the defendant's part to know they might receive it, the jury 
should not have been instructed that children were part of the 
66 community." The Court concluded that the giving of such an 
instruction was reversible error. 
The defendant also objected to including "sensitive" persons 
within the standard, but the Court thought this not to be error. 
Even though statements in Roth and Miller had indicated that 
average rather than particularly susceptible and sensitive (or 
unsusceptible and insensitive) persons provide the standard, this 
does not mean that sensitive or insensitive persons, however de- 
fined, are to be excluded from the definition of community. 
In the narrow and limited context of this case, the community 
includes all adults who comprise it, and a jury can consider 
them all in determining relevant community standards. The 
vice is in focusing upon the most susceptible or sensitive mem- 
bers when judging the obscenity of materials, not in including 
them along with all others in the community.306 
The Court noted the difficulty in framing instructions on the 
point, particularly as to what "sensitive" and "insensitive" 
mean, but persons thus characterized are part of the community 
and may be properly referred to in jury instructions. 
Pinkus also found fault with instructions about "deviant sex- 
ual groups" in defining prurient interest. In the Court's analysis, 
however, the materials a t  issue, or some of them, probably would 
have appealed to such a group. "Nothing prevents a court from 
giving an instruction on prurient appeal to deviant sexual groups 
as part of an instruction pertaining to appeal to the average per- 
son when the evidence, as here, would support such a charge."307 
The Court reconfirmed that expert testimony is unnecessary 
to a decision that materials are obscene. The defendant argued, 
however, that the prosecution should be required to advance evi- 
dence to aid a jury in determining what will stimulate deviant 
groups. The Court rejected this contention, noting that the prose- 
cution in this case had in fact presented expert testimony "which, 
when combined with the exhibits themselves, sufficiently guided 
the In Pinkus, therefore, the trial court instruction was 
proper. 
The opinion also noted that a pandering instruction30g is al- 
306. 98 S. Ct. at 1813. 
307. Id. at 1814. 
308. Id. at 1815. 
309. See George, supra note 299, at 202-03. 
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ways relevant to aid a jury in determining whether materials are 
obscene in light of the ways they were created, promoted, or dis- 
seminated. The government's evidence in Pinkus was adequate 
to support such an instruction, even though it was not extensive 
on "methods of production, editorial goals, if any, methods of 
operation, or means of delivery other than the mailings and the 
names, locations, and occupations of the recipients."310 
C. Miscellaneous Statutory Interpretation 
The Court dealt with a somewhat esoteric aspect of the Clean 
Air Act311 which empowered the Administrator of the Environ- 
mental Protection Agency to promulgate emission standards for 
hazardous air pollutants.312 Violations of the Act are made crimi- 
nal.313 The statute also specifically forbids judicial review of ad- 
ministrative action promulgating an emission standard except in 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within 
thirty days after promulgation of such a standard.314 
In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,315 defendant com- 
pany was indicted in connection with asbestos standards relating 
to building demolition. The regulation in question set out proce- 
dures to be used in demolition but did not set a specific emission 
level. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the indict- 
ment because it thought the regulation was not actually an emis- 
sion standard although labeled as such. The court of appeals 
reversed on the basis that anything promulgated as such was an 
emission standard under section 112(c) of the statute, and there- 
fore unreviewable within the terms of the Act. The Supreme 
Court reversed. 
The Court characterized the issue as "[wlhen is an emission 
standard not an emission standard?"316 Under an earlier deci- 
~ion,~l '  questions involving the nonreviewability of administrative 
310. Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. at  1815. Because of the way the Court disposed 
of the case, it did not pass on the question of whether the trial court had acted properly 
in rejecting defense comparison evidence in the form of films which assertedly had popular 
acceptance in Los Angeles and elsewhere in the country, and thus demonstrated com- 
munity tolerance of the material Pinkus was charged with having mailed; the court of 
appeals was left free to resolve the issue on remand. 
311. 42 U.S.C.A. 0 0 7401 et seq. (Supp. 1977). 
312. 42 U.S.C.A. 8 7412(b)(l)(B) (Supp. 1977). 
313. 42 U.S.C.A. 0 7413(c)(l)(C) (Supp. 1977). 
314. 42 U9S.C.A. 0 7607(b)(l) (Supp. 1977). 
315. 434 U S .  275 (1978). 
316. Id. a t  278. 
317. Yakus v. United States, 321 U S .  414 (1944) (sustaining the validity of a provi- 
sion of the Wartime Emergency Price Control Act that forbade contesting the validity of 
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regulations are not to be determined routinely. The Clean Air Act 
precluded review of but one class of regulations, not all regula- 
tions issued under its provisions. Moreover, Congress imposed 
criminal penalties for only some violations. The statute as a 
whole indicates that emission standards are of greater signifi- 
cance than other standards or regulations; hence the limitation 
on judicial review. But, the Court determined, under the canon 
of strict construction of criminal legislation, a criminal trial court 
may determine whether a regulation upon which prosecution is 
based is indeed an emission standard as delineated in the statute. 
This does not mean that federal district courts can review a stan- 
dard generally, considering such matters as whether an agency 
complied with administrative promulgation procedures or 
whether it acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The only issue is 
whether the regulation in question is, on its face, an emission 
standard as defined by Congress. 
On the merits of Adamo Wrecking, the Court found much to 
indicate that an emission standard must incorporate a level of 
pollution and not merely methods of avoiding pollution. While a 
subsequent amendment to the statute would not necessarily gov- 
ern a decision relating to earlier conduct, a majority of the Court 
found, contrary to the prosecution argument, that a 1977 statu- 
tory reformulation confirmed the importance of emission levels 
and the distinction between such levels and work practice stan- 
dards. Therefore, on the facts of the case, the district court ruled 
correctly. 
Adamo Wrecking is thus a rather narrow ruling on a point 
esoteric to those not charged under the legislation. The Court 
certainly took pains to avoid opening up the constitutionality of 
legislation regulating the environment. Nevertheless, several 
asides by the Justices reflecting on a legislative ban on contesting 
regulations, a t  least in the context of criminal prosecutions, 
seems to signal a significant constitutional issue for later resolu- 
tion. . 
The Sherman Antitrust Act is not strict liability legislation 
under the Court's view in United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co. 31R The government alleged that six primary manufacturers of 
gypsum board had conspired to fix prices, principally through the 
exchange of pricing information. At trial, the court instructed 
that the defendants were presumed to intend the necessary and 
regulations in the course of any civil or criminal proceeding). 
318. 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978). A procedural aspect of the case is discussed in text accom- 
panying notes 197-200 supra. 
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natural consequences of their acts. It also in effect ruled out reli- 
ance on compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act31g as a defense 
to Sherman Act charges. Finally, it restricted the defense of with- 
drawal from a conspiracy to affirmative notice to all other mem- 
bers of a conspiracy or disclosure .of an illegal enterprise to law 
enforcement officials. The jury convicted but the court of appeals 
reversed; the Supreme Court affirmed. 
A majority of the Court thought that strict liability could not 
be imposed under the antitrust law: 
[A] defendant's state of mind or intent is an element of a 
criminal antitrust offense which must be established by evi- 
dence and inferences drawn therefrom and cannot be taken from 
the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of 
wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices.32o 
There is nothing in the history of the legislation to signal a con- 
gressional purpose to make violations of the Act strict liability 
offenses. Moreover, the sweep of the language is broad (although 
not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite), and the punish- 
ment severe. There is a sufficient array of noncriminal enforce- 
ment measures under the statute to leave it enforceable without 
exacting strict liability criminal penalties. To meet its burden 
under the statute so construed, the government can rely on the 
premise that "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable 
consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects 
can be a sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability 
under the antitrust laws."321 As the Court noted, ''[;]here care- 
fully planned and calculated conduct is being scrutinized in the 
context of a criminal prosecution, the perpetrator's knowledge of 
the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a find- 
ing of criminal intent."322 The trial court did not instruct properly 
in this respect. 
The Court then turned to the question of whether verification 
of competitor price concessions, intended solely to fit within sec- 
tion 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act,3W should also amount to 
a controlling circumstance precluding liability under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.324 The Court concluded a good faith belief that 
319. 15 U.S.C. $ 4  13-13b, 21a (1976). Section 13(b) relates to exchange of price 
information to meet competition. 
320. 98 S. Ct. at 2872. 
321. Id. at 2877. 
322. Id. at 2878. 
323. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976). 
324. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
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a price concession is offered to meet a correspondingly low price 
set by a competitor is a defense under the Robinson-Patman Act, 
and is available to defend against an antitrust prosecution as 
well. The Court discussed the likelihood of isolated inquiries 
being used successfully as a defense to a federal prosecution, and 
found little danger. However, "exchanges of price informa- 
tion-even when putatively for purposes of Robinson-Patman Act 
compliance-must remain subject to close scrutiny under the 
Sherman 
The majority also found error in the trial court's instructions 
on withdrawal from a conspiracy. A more expansive version had 
been requested by defendants, and there is precedent for modes 
of withdrawal other than those to which the trial court limited 
jury consideration: affirmative actions inconsistent with the ob- 
ject of a conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably 
calculated to reach coconspirators, for example. Thus, a broader 
instruction was to be given on retrial, although regrettably the 
Court did not draft one for the guidance of federal trial courts. 
In United States v. C ~ l b e r t , ~ ~ ~  the Court construed the Hobbs 
ActSn as not requiring proof of "racketeering" as a condition to 
conviction. The defendant, charged with having committed at- 
tempted bank robbery through threats of physical violence to an 
officer of a federally insured bank, claimed that such an element 
was indispensable. The Court disagreed. 
The statutory language is clear in covering robbery as a 
means of obstructing interstate commerce; nothing on its face 
refers to a requirement of racketeering. Indeed, to implant such 
a requirement would raise "serious constitutional problems, in 
view of the absence of any definition of racketeering in the stat- 
~ t e . " ~ ~ ~  As a racketeering requirement might render the statute 
vague and indefinite, such an interpretation, in the Court's view, 
should be avoided. Preenactment materials were also consistent 
with an interpretation that racketeering is not an essential ele- 
ment under the statute, which was aimed at  difficulties in earlier 
legislation not relating to racketeering. Congress was careful to 
define the covered criminal activity in detaik so that a congres- 
sional intent to include a term not defined in the statute as a 
prerequisite to criminality was inconceivable to the Court. 
The defendant asserted that ambiguities should be resolved 
325. 98 S. Ct. a t  2884. 
326. 435 U.S. 371 (1978). 
327. 18 U.S.C. 5 5  1951-1956 (1976). 
328. 435 U.S. a t  374. 
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in favor of lenity, but the Court "decline[d] to manufacture 
ambiguity where none exists."32g It also was claimed that a prob- 
lem in federal-state relations would arise unless racketeering were 
made an element of the federal crime, but preenactment materi- 
als clearly showed that Congress had considered the matter di- 
rectly and had concluded that there was no conflict in light of 
state failure or inability to cope effectively with the problem at 
which the federal statute was aimed. 
County Board v. RichardsSS0 sustained the power of local au- 
thorities to restrict street parking for the benefit of local resi- 
dents. The Court found the parking control a reasonable encour- 
agement to car pools and mass transit. A local legislature also 
may decide that controlled flow of traffic into a neighborhood is 
required to "enhance the quality of life there by reducing noise, 
traffic hazards, and litter."331 The Constitution does not ban such 
objectives and does not presume that distinctions between resi- 
dents and nonresidents are invidious. All that is necessary is that 
an ordinance "rationally promote the regulation's objectives,"332 
and this the Arlington County ordinance did. 
The Court's fourth amendment decisions perhaps have 
aroused the greatest controversy, particularly Zurcher and 
Barlow S, Inc. Yet, after relatively calm analysis, there is nothing 
strikingly new in the constitutional principles relied on. The same 
can be said of the Court's treatment of protracted searches in 
Mincey v. Arizona. In terms of the routine functioning of the 
criminal justice system, perhaps Franks u. Delaware will engen- 
der the most litigation, in that it is difficult to believe that fre- 
quent attacks on search (and perhaps arrest) warrant affidavits 
will not result, despite the Court's effort to limit its holding se- 
verely. If officers' safety can be endangered, the Court seems 
ready to adopt a constitutional interpretation to protect them, as 
the Mimms holding and Mincey asides illustrate. Finally, 
Ceccolini suggests that a balancing test333 governs in the applica- 
tion of exclusionary rules, a conclusion bolstered by the Court's 
handling of the confessions aspect of Mincey. Hence, nothing in 
329. Id. at  379. 
330. 434 U.S. 5 (1977). 
331. Id. at  7. 
332. Id. 
333. In effect, the need for probative evidence is balanced against the need to deter 
deliberate or reckless official misconduct. 
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the 1977-1978 Term signals a retreat from or additional major 
modifications of the scope of evidentiary exclusionary rules. 
In the sphere of judicial proceedings, only the administration 
of the double jeopardy provision saw significant reevaluation by 
the Court. Even there, the net impact is less a reworking of funda- 
mental doctrine than it is a bit of architectural embellishment 
here and some foundation repairs there. The Court manifested no 
desire to let states experiment very far in local variations on a 
federal theme, as Crist v. Bretz illustrated. Nor is the Court in- 
clined to permit much balancing of harm to defendants against 
harm to the system, judging from its rejection in Bretz of such 
an approach as an alternative to an outright bar of retrial after 
the cessation of original proceedings on grounds other than mani- 
fest necessity. On the whole, however, the Court's doctrinal posi- 
tion is no worse, and may well be better, than the ad hoc applica- 
tion of a due process standard. 
The Court's handling of Federal Civil Rights Act remedies 
reflects a somewhat similar mix to that found under the double 
jeopardy doctrine: in certain respects citizens' ability to recover 
under the law has been enhanced, but not at the expense of inor- 
dinate disruption of the justice system or massive revision of the 
spheres of responsibility of the states and the federal government. 
That the remainder of a somewhat reduced number of 
criminal-law-related decisions (in comparison to the two or three 
preceding Terms) bears on fairly narrow points perhaps confirms 
a generalization which may be drawn from the entire body of 
decisions during the Term: pragmatic response to specific prob- 
lems generated by a functioning legal system is more acceptable 
to a majority of the Justices than establishment of general princi- 
ples of constitutional law to which specific decisions are made to 
conform, however uncomfortably. Such an approach naturally 
leaves many points to be resolved and inconsistencies to be elimi- 
nated when variant cases arise. On the whole, however, it cannot 
be said that the Court's current disposition of constitutional is- 
sues generates more second-generation litigation than the sweep- 
ing approach of the Warren Court era; it may indeed promote a 
more satisfactory administration of the justice machinery in the 
long run. 
